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I.
INTRODUCTION

After three weeks of trial and careful deliberation, the
jury in this case found that Anthony W. Middleton, Jr. ("Anthony
Middleton") and his wife, Carol S. Middleton ("Carol Middleton")
intentionally, wrongfully and maliciously interfered with Medical
Leasing1s prospective economic relationship with The Boyer Company
with the dominant purpose to harm Medical Leasing and thereby also
breached

paragraph

8 of the Amended

Ground

Lease between the

parties and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing implied
therein by sabotaging a proposed sublease between Medical Leasing
and The Boyer Company with threats of groundless litigation unless
Medical Leasing surrendered to Anthony Middletonfs demands for
additional compensation.

The court then properly ruled that all

of the Middletons were jointly

liable for Anthony

Middleton1s

breach of contract because they were all the "Landlord" under the
Amended Ground Lease.
The Middletons now ask this court to cast aside the jury's
verdict.
demonstrate
sufficient

The
—

Middletons1

protest

—

but

abjectly

that the evidence as a matter

to support

the jury's verdict

committed errors of law during the trial.

fail

to

of law was not

and that

the court

In that regard, the

Middletons have an absolute obligation to marshal

all of the

evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which
support the verdict.

Only then can they attempt to demonstrate

there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict.

2

They do

not even attempt to marshal the evidence.

Instead, they select

small pieces of the record, typically out of context, cast those
small bits in a light favorable to the Middletons and thereby
ignore most of the evidence upon which the jury based its verdict.
The jury heard and conscientiously decided this case.

The

evidence was more than sufficient to support its verdict. The jury
was properly instructed concerning the law and no legal errors were
committed which would
jury's verdict.
and

the

judgment

remotely

justify the repudiation of the

As will now be demonstrated, the jury's verdict
rendered

thereon

should

be

affirmed

in all

respects.

II.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989).

III.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court properly admit Medical Leasing's

and the Middletons1 evidence regarding the Zions Litigation?

The

standard of review on this issue is whether the trial court's
ruling was clearly erroneous.

Whitehead v. American Motors Sales

Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990).

3

2.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the Amended

Ground Lease between the parties did not require written notice of
default as a condition precedent to bringing suit for breach of the
express terms of the lease and/or the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing?

The standard of review of this is de novo

review for correctness.

Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah

1985) .
3.

Even if written notice of default had been required by

the Amended Ground Lease, did Medical Leasing give the required
written notice of default before commencing suit?

The standard of

review on this issue is whether taking all the evidence supporting
the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences to be derived
therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
verdict, the

jury's determination

is clearly

erroneous.

Car

Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82, 83 (Utah 1981).
4.

Did Anthony

Middleton's

intentional

and

malicious

threats of groundless litigation, made with the dominant purpose
and/or

intended

immediate effect to injure Medical Leasing by

derailing its sublease with The Boyer Company, constitute a breach
of the express provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground
Lease under which the Middletons agreed that Medical Leasing could
lease the Property to an unrelated third party for development
without the Middletons' consent unless subordination was sought?
The standard of review with respect to Anthony Middleton's conduct
is whether taking all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict
and all reasonable inferences to be derived therefrom and viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the jury's

4

determination is clearly erroneous.
supra.

Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont,

The standard of review with respect to the interpretation

of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease is de
novo review for correctness.
5.

Kimball v. Campbell, supra.

Did the trial court properly award Medical Leasing

attorney's fees in view of the jury's verdict that the Middletons
breached the lease and that Anthony Middleton and Carol Middleton
interfered with Medical Leasingfs prospective business relationship
with The Boyer Company?

The standard of review on this issue is

de novo review for correctness. Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d
266 (Utah 1992).
6.

Did the trial court properly rule that as a matter of

law all of the Middletons were liable on the breach of contract
claims because they were the "Landlord" under the Amended Ground
Lease between the parties and undertook the same obligations and
duties and promised the same performance thereunder?

The standard

of review on this issue is de novo review for correctness. Kimball
v. Campbell, supra.
7. Did the trial court properly rule that Medical Leasing
had pled sufficient facts in its Amended Complaint to raise the
issue of whether the Middletons were jointly liable for breach of
contract as "Landlord" under the Amended Ground Lease?

The

standard of review on this issue is whether the trial court's
decision was clearly erroneous. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales
Corp.f supra.
8.

Was there any substantial evidence to support the

jury's verdict that Anthony Middleton's threats of groundless

5

litigation caused damage to Medical Leasing?

The standard of

review on this issue is whether taking all the evidence supporting
the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences to be derived
therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
verdict, the jury's determination is clearly erroneous.

Car

Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, supra.
9.

Was

the

jury's

verdict

that

Anthony

Middleton

intentionally and maliciously made threats of groundless litigation
with the dominant purpose and/or the intended immediate effect to
harm Medical Leasing supported by any substantial evidence and, if
so, was that sufficient to satisfy the improper purpose or improper
means element of Medical Leasing's interference with prospective
business relationship claims? The standard of review with respect
to the

jury's

findings

is whether

taking

all

the

evidence

supporting the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences to be
derived

therefrom

and viewing the evidence

in a light most

favorable to the verdict, the jury's determination is clearly
erroneous.

Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, supra.

The standard of

review on the issue of the legal requirements of the improper
purpose

and

improper

means

elements

is de

novo

review

for

correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).
10.

Did the trial court correctly reject the Middletons1

contention that they were privileged, as a matter of law, to
intentionally and maliciously make threats of groundless litigation
with the dominant purpose, or intended immediate effect, to harm
Medical Leasing?

The standard of review on this issue is de novo

review for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., supra.

6

11.

Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury on

recovery of future lost profits and damages?

The standard of

review on this issue is de novo review for correctness.

Ramon v.

Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989).
12.

Was the trial court's decision on the amount of

attorney's fees Medical Leasing was entitled to recover supported
by the evidence?

The standard of review on this issue is whether

there was any substantial evidence to support the court's exercise
of its discretion.

Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, supra.

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case arises out of an Amended Ground Lease entered
into between Medical Leasing and the Middletons in 1980 with
respect to an approximately nine (9) acre parcel of land on the
northwest corner of 3900 South and 700 East in Salt Lake County
(the "Property").

The Amended Ground Lease, before and after it

was modified by a settlement stipulation entered into in the
previous Zions Litigation (discussed below), gave Medical Leasing
the right to sublease the undeveloped portion of the Property for
development by an independent third party without the Middletons'
consent unless subordination was sought.
When Medical Leasing attempted to sublease a portion of
the

Property

to

The

Boyer

Company

7

for

a

large

commercial

development on a long-term sublease which would have netted Medical
Leasing millions of dollars over the life of the sublease, Anthony
Middleton intentionally and maliciously interfered and eventually
sabotaged

the

transaction

by

making

threats

of

groundless

litigation unless his demands that the Middletons share in the
revenues were met.

After The Boyer Company withdrew from the

transaction, Medical Leasing commenced this action seeking recovery
for breach of the express provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended
Ground Lease and the implied covenant of good

faith and fair

dealing and for interference with prospective economic relations
and other relief.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Medical Leasing commenced this lawsuit on February 16,
1990.
implied

[R. 2 ] . In addition to claims for the breach of express and
contract

relations,

the

and

interference

original

Complaint

with
also

prospective
contained

interference with contract and for a declaratory
injunction.

economic

a claim

for

judgment and

The Complaint alleged that all of the Middletons were

the Landlord under the Amended Ground Lease, that Anthony Middleton
acted as their agent and that all the Middletons were liable for
the damages alleged in the Complaint.
The Middletons filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
The trial court dismissed Count I for declaratory judgment and
injunction.

Medical

Leasing

then

filed

an Amended

Complaint

containing the same claims for relief, except for the declaratory
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relief and injunction claim which had been dismissed.

[R. 319].

The Middletons moved for summary judgment. The court granted that
motion with respect to the Second Claim for Relief for interference
with contract on the basis that the Development Agreement between
Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company upon which that claim was
based had expired by

its own terms.

Middletons1 motion was denied.

The remainder of the

[R. 1078].

On February 11, 1992, the case went to jury trial. After
approximately three weeks of trial, the jury returned its verdict
determining that Anthony Middleton and his wife, Carol Middleton,1
were

liable

for

breach

of

contract

and

interference

with

prospective business relationship and awarding compensatory damages
in favor of Medical Leasing
together

with

interest

in the amount of $2,582,780.00,

and punitive

Middleton in the sum of $75,000.00.

damages

against Anthony

[R. 1569, 1584].

Judge Rigtrup had reserved the issue of whether the other
Middletons were liable for Anthony Middleton's breach of contract
pending receipt of the jury verdict.

After the jury returned its

verdict, Judge Rigtrup ruled that because the Middletons had all
executed the Amended Ground Lease with Medical Leasing as the
"Landlord" and had promised the same performance thereunder that
the Middletons were all liable for the breach of contract.
2962].

The

Middletons

then

filed

Motions

for

[R.

Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial which were denied by
the trial court.

[R. 1903-2248].

Carol Middleton's liability was co-extensive with that of Anthony Middleton by her testimony that he
acted as her agent with respect to the Property and in all respects. [R. 5034].
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Pursuant to previous agreement between the parties, the
issue of attorney's fees was reserved for ruling by the trial court
upon affidavits.

Medical Leasing's Motion for Award of Attorney's

Fees and Costs was supported by extensive affidavits, including
copies of all billings substantiating the services performed on
behalf of Medical Leasing.

Medical Leasing sought attorney's fees

in the amount of $319,502.00 and costs consisting principally of
expert fees in the amount of $55,536.26. The court determined that
$275,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee and the Middletons
stipulated not to contest that amount except they reserved their
right to contend that Medical Leasing had not properly allocated
its fees between claims on which attorney's fees could be awarded
and

claims

on which

attorney's

fees

could

supposedly

not be

awarded.
Thereafter, the court entered judgment in favor of Medical
Leasing on August 28, 1992 in the amount of $2,582,780.00 plus
attorney's

fees

in

the

amount

of

interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

$275,000.00, together
[R. 2954].

with

It is from this

judgment that the Middletons appeal.

C.

Statement of Facts.

The Medical Leasinq-Middleton Ground Leases
1.

The Middletons are owners as tenants in common of the

real property which is the subject of this action consisting of
approximately nine (9) acres located at the northwest corner of 700
East 3900 South in Salt Lake County (the "Property") . The Property
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was previously owned by Richard P. Middleton, Anthony W. Middleton,
Sr. and Delores Middleton, who were brothers and sister.
and 4972].

[R. 4 317

Medical Leasing is a partnership comprised of Dr.

Wallace H. Ring ("Ring"), Dr. John C. Adair ("Adair") and Dr. Harry
C. Wong ("Wong").
2.

[R. 3988].

On July 21, 1975, the Middletons leased the Property

to Medical Leasing's predecessor, Salt Lake Surgical Center, Inc.,
for a term of fifty years with an option to renew for an additional
thirty years.

Salt Lake Surgical Center, Inc. intended to and did

construct a surgical center on two acres of the Property. The
Middletons agreed to subordinate their ownership interest to the
construction
project.

lender's

Trust

Deed

in

order

to

facilitate

the

to

the

[Plaintiff's Ex. 1 ] .
3.

In

1980, Medical

Leasing

proposed

expand

surgical center and the parties entered into an Amended Ground
Lease dated August 1, 1980 pursuant to which the Middletons agreed
to subordinate an additional .75 acres for the expansion of the
surgical center in return for lease concessions to the Middletons.
[Plaintiff's Ex. 3 ] .
4.
Medical

Paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease dealt with

Leasing's right to develop additional portions of the

Property in the future.

Paragraph 8 provided that the Middletons

were not obligated to subordinate any additional portion of the
Property and that Medical Leasing could not further develop the
Property without

the Middletons' consent, except

that Medical

Leasing was not precluded "from selling or subleasing its interest
in the remaining portion of the Leased Premises to an independent
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third party for development or otherwise, provided Lessee is not
a joint venturer, partner, stockholder, participant, or otherwise
involved, directly or indirectly in the development of the Property
with such third party."

[Plaintiff's Ex. 3 ] .

The Zions's Litigation
5.

In August,

1980, Medical

Leasing

entered

into a

sublease with Zions First National Bank ("Zions") for the sublease
of a portion of the Property for the construction by Zions of a
branch office.
proceeds

of

[Plaintiff's Ex. 4 ] .
an

industrial

revenue

After Zions obtained the
bond

offering

for

the

construction of a permanent facility, it became concerned as to
whether paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease required that the
Middletons' consent be obtained for the proposed development and
requested that the Middletons simply confirm that their consent was
not necessary or, in the alternative, give their consent.

The

Middletons refused to do either and, through their attorney, simply
told Zions it would have to proceed at its peril.
4026-4050; Plaintiff's Exs. 7, 8 and 9].

[R. 4010-4016,

Accordingly, in January,

1983, Zions commenced litigation (the "Zions Litigation") against
the Middletons and Medical Leasing seeking a declaration that no
consent

of

the

Middletons

was

necessary

for

Zions1

proposed

development or, if it were necessary, that Medical Leasing was
obligated to obtain such consent.
6.

The Middletons

[R. 4037; Plaintiff's Ex. 10].

filed a Third

Party Complaint and

Counterclaim in the Zions Litigation in which, among other things,
they asked

for a declaration as to whether their consent was

necessary for the Zions development, and alleged that at the time
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the Amended Ground Lease had been negotiated and executed they had
understood

that

their

consent

would

be

necessary

before

any

significant future development of the Property was undertaken, that
by mistake the Amended Ground Lease did not accurately reflect that
supposed right, and therefore they were entitled to reformation of
the Amended Ground Lease.
15].

[R. 4113-4115; Plaintiff's Exs. 11 and

At the trial subject of this appeal, it was admitted that

such allegations were not true.

[R. 5031-5032, 5693-5700, 4013-

4020, 4324-4338, 5578-5584].
7.

In July, 1983, the Third District Court, the Honorable

Judith M. Billings, Judge, entered partial summary judgment in
favor of Zions determining as a matter of law that the consent of
the Middletons was not required
Property.
8.

for Zions1 development of the

[Plaintiff's Ex. 12].
Thereafter, in 1985, the Zions Litigation was fully

settled pursuant to a Stipulation and Mutual Release of All Claims.
As part of the settlement, Medical Leasing paid the Middletons
$21,000 and paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease was restated
as follows:
[C]onsent of the Middletons to the future development
of the Leased Premises is not required unless the
Lessee shall seek to develop the Property or an
independent third party sublessee or assignee requires
that the interest of the Middletons be subordinated
to the interest of a development lender.
In other
words, the lessee may not develop the property without
the consent of the Middletons, but a third party
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the
lessee may further develop the Property without the
consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed
capital provided subordination of the interest of the
Middletons is not required for said development.
[R. 4042-4044 and Plaintiff's Ex. 16].
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The Boyer Company Negotiations
9.

After soliciting Medical Leasing's interest, on or

about March 8, 1988, The Boyer Company made a written proposal to
lease 5.135

acres of the Property

for an annual ground

payment of $111,840.00 with escalations.

lease

[R. 4059 and Plaintiff's

Ex. 20]. In the initial discussions, Medical Leasing made it clear
that Boyer would have to live with the terms of the Amended Ground
Lease and that no subordination or amendments could be requested
of the Middletons.

Boyer responded to the effect that if Zions

could develop the Property on that basis, so could he.

[R. 4052-

4053].
10.

Thereafter, Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company

engaged in negotiations which culminated in the execution of a
Development

Agreement

dated

June

14, 1988.

The

Development

Agreement provided for rental at the rate of $111,84 0.00 per year
with escalations.

Boyer1s obligation to lease the Property was

subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions precedent such as
rezoning of the Property and other matters. The agreement provided
that the lease would be executed no later than December 31, 1988.
The Development Agreement did not contain any contingency regarding
The Boyer Company's ability to obtain financing for the proposed
commercial business and professional

office space development.

Boyer understood that the Development Agreement would be subject
to the Amended Ground Lease.
11.

[R. 4088, 4840; Plaintiff's Ex. 22].

The Boyer Company prepared drawings, site plans and

financial proformas.

[Plaintiff's Exs. 23 and 50].

The Boyer

Company undertook to fulfill the conditions precedent contained in
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the Development Agreement and after what Greg Gardner of The Boyer
Company described as "a long and arduous process" was successful
in having the Property rezoned in October, 1988. [Plaintiff's Ex.
28] .
12.

By letter dated December 22, 1988, H. Roger Boyer

("Boyer") of The Boyer Company notified Medical Leasing that the
contingencies

set forth in the Development Agreement had been

fulfilled and requested an extension of the December 31, 1988
deadline

for executing

a written

lease

Medical Leasing agreed to this request.
13.

to January

31, 1989.

[Plaintiff's Ex. 32].

On February 3, 1989, John Parsons ("Parsons"), the

attorney for Medical Leasing, transmitted to Greg Gardner at The
Boyer Company a proposed sublease.
deadline

had expired,

continued

negotiating

Medical

Although the January 31, 1989

Leasing

the sublease

mention that the deadline had expired.

and The Boyer

in good

Company

faith without any

[R. 4499-4500, 4517, 4521-

4522, 4537; Plaintiff's Ex. 33].
14.

The Boyer Company sent the proposed sublease to its

attorney, Victor A. Taylor ("Taylor") at Kimball, Parr, Crockett
& Waddoups for review.
14,

1989 to Parsons

sublease.

Taylor then delivered a letter dated March
containing

his comments

on the proposed

In that letter, Taylor requested that there be included

in the sublease a non-disturbance and attornment clause pursuant
to which

the Middletons would

consent

to and approve

of the

sublease and agree that in the event the Amended Ground Lease with
Medical Leasing was terminated that The Boyer Company's rights
would not be adversely affected and the sublease would continue in
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full force and effect between the Middletons and The Boyer Company.
Taylor also expressed concern that § 5.3(ii) of the sublease which
provided for an annual rental escalation based upon increases in
the rental income received from the premises by The Boyer Company
constituted a breach of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease
between the Middletons and Medical Leasing because paragraph 8 of
the Amended Ground Lease only gave Medical Leasing the right to
sublease the Property for development by a third party if Medical
Leasing

was

not

"a

joint

venturer,

partner,

stockholder,

participant, or otherwise involved, directly or indirectly in the
development of the Property with such third party."

In this

regard, the purported language which gave rise to Taylor's concern
had been superseded by the settlement stipulation in the Zions
Litigation which did not contain any such limitation on Medical
Leasing's right to sublease.
aware

of

the

later

Taylor later admitted he was not

agreement.

[R.

4499-4501, 4506,

5475;

Plaintiff's Ex. 16; Defendants1 Ex. 14].
15.

Two days later, on March 16, 1989, Boyer, Gardner and

Taylor, representing The Boyer Company, met with Dr. Wong and
Parsons, representing Medical Leasing, to discuss the concerns
raised in Taylor's March 14, 1989 letter.

During that meeting,

Parsons explained to Taylor that the language that Taylor relied
upon from the Amended Ground Lease concerning Medical Leasing's
participation

in the development of the project as a joint

venturer, partner, etc. had

been

deleted.

Parsons

further

explained to Taylor that in the Zions sublease the parties had
included a requirement that in the event Medical Leasing received

16

any notice of default

from the Middletons that the notice be

promptly given to Zions and Zions would have a right to cure the
default.
for

the

Parsons suggested that provision was a good substitute
requested

non-recognition

and

attornment

provisions.

Parsons agreed to send Taylor a copy of the Zions stipulation and
the relevant provision of the Zions sublease.
desire to go forward with the project.

Boyer expressed his

No one said anything about

the Development Agreement having expired or the deal being off.
[R. 4509-4515, 4884-4888].
16.

On or about April 10, 1989, Parsons sent a letter to

The Boyer Company enclosing a copy of the relevant portion of the
Zions sublease.
17.

[R. 4517-4518; Defendants1 Ex. 15].

On July 25, 1989, a meeting was held in the Board room

of Parsons1 law office.
attended

Drs. Adair, Wong and Ring and Parsons

representing Medical

Taylor attended

Leasing,

and

Boyer, Gardner

representing The Boyer Company.

and

Taylor again

started expressing his concerns expressed in his March 14, 1989
letter.

Dr. Ring heatedly told Taylor that Medical Leasing had

made

clear

it

before

that

it was

not

going

to

ask

for

any

concessions from the Middletons and that Medical Leasing would not
deal with those issues.
"That's not important.
work around that.

Boyer waived off his attorney, saying:
We don't need to deal with that.

Let's get —

We can

go ahead and make this deal.

came here to make a deal, I didn't come here to break one."

I

Boyer

then expressed that his major concern was that he did not want to
get into the litigation box Zions had gotten itself into and that
he wanted to talk with his good friend, Anthony Middleton, to

17

determine the Middletons1 attitude on development of the Property.
Medical Leasing finally agreed that Boyer could talk with Anthony
Middleton provided that he would not ask for anything from the
Middletons and no money would be offered.

Bover stated that the

only thing that he could see that would stop The Bover Company from
going forward with the sublease was the threat of litigation from
the Middletons.

[R. 4116-4122, 4281, 4531-4536, 4888-4894].

18. Anthony Middleton and Boyer were good friends, having
attended East High School together.
serving together

As of 1989-1990 they were

in their church, Boyer being

in the Stake

Presidency

and Anthony Middleton on the Stake High Council,

overseeing

the

religious

affairs

of

their

Stake.

relationship continued through the time of the trial.

Their
[R. 4 341-

4342].
The Wrongful Threats of Groundless Litigation
19.

After the July 25, 1989 meeting, Boyer contacted

Anthony Middleton and explained that The Boyer Company was going
to develop the Property.

Anthony Middleton1s entry in his diary

on August 6, 1989 demonstrated his knowledge that Medical Leasing
was entitled to sublease the Property to The Boyer Company without
the Middletons• consent and his chagrin that the Middletons would
not be entitled to any share of the profits:
I just learned two weekends ago from Roger Boyer
that something was up with the 3 9th South property and
his comment to me just in passing at church was that
we needed to talk for a few minutes about what was
going on there, and he implied that I must already
know. In fact, I had heard nothing about it and I
called up Dick Middleton and asked if he had heard
something and he had not.
Last night I got ahold of Roger after having
tried through the week without success to do so and
it turns out that Dr. Wong, Ring and Adair are trying
18

to get The Boyer Company to develop both retail shops
as well as business offices on the property. Roger's
company is so strong that they can do without
subordination and I suspect we are dead in the water
the way that stupid contract is put together by Uncle
Dick and William Morel. I am going to meet with Roger
this coming Tuesday morning to go over the plans and
see if there is something that can be done about it,
but my strong hunch is that we are sunk and will have
to live with the idea that those birds will derive a
very handsome income off the development without
actually including the actual owners of the land at
all.
[R. 4345-4347; Plaintiff's Ex. 37].
20.

On August 7 or 8, 1989, Anthony Middleton met with

Boyer to review The Boyer Company's plans for the project. Anthony
Middleton

discussed

with

Boyer

whether

the

consent

of

the

Middletons was necessary for development of the Property by The
Boyer Company.
position

and

Anthony Middleton told Boyer that
that

of

the

other

family

members

it was his
that,

"any

development would require compensation to the owner" and "that they
had to be part of the eventual development mix." That was the same
position that the Middletons had taken in the Zions Litigation.
Anthony Middleton reported this conversation and his statement of
the position of the Middletons to both George Middleton and Richard
G. Middleton.
Anthony

Either at this meeting or at subsequent meetings,

Middleton told

compensated

there

would

Boyer that
be

if the Middletons were

litigation.

Boyer

told

not

Anthony

Middleton he was not interested in doing the development if there
was going to be litigation.
21.

[R. 4347-4354].

On September 26, 1989, a meeting was held at The Boyer

Company's offices attended by Boyer, Anthony Middleton and Dr. Ring
to attempt to alleviate Boyer's concerns about the Middletons
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filing suit.
Company

In that meeting, Boyer repeated

wanted

to

do

the

development,

but

that The Boyer

that

he

was

not

interested in going forward if there was going to be litigation.
Boyer stated that Anthony Middleton seemed to have the idea that
consent of the Middletons was required
anything;

but

it

seemed

clear

under

before he could build
the

lease

between

the

Middletons and Medical Leasing that Middletons1 consent to the
sublease was not required. Anthony Middleton responded that it was
his position and the position of the Middletons that if there was
any

further development

of the Property

they had

a right to

participate and that, "If so much as a stake was driven into the
ground, there would be a lawsuit, unless we participate."

Boyer

asked Anthony Middleton his basis for threatening suit and Dr.
Middleton responded, "I have a philosophical basis, as the rightful
landowner, to participate, that's the only basis I need."

Dr.

Middleton did not contend that there was any provision in the
Amended Ground Lease requiring the Middletons1 consent or entitling
them

to

any

Middleton
litigation.

at

compensation.
that

meeting

The
was

only
to

thing

asked

withdraw

the

of

Anthony

threats

of

Anthony Middleton made the following entry in his

diary concerning that meeting:
The following night, September 2 6th, I met with
Roger Boyer concerning the development of the 39th
South and 7th East property owned by the Middleton
family. It turns out that Wally Ring and that bunch
talked Boyer into developing the rest of the property
with commercial development, putting up an office
complex as well as a few retail shops. Roger Boyer
kindly tipped me off to the whole thing, wondering if
the family was acquiescing to that. On the 2 6th I met
with Roger, Greg Gardner (Kim's brother) [sic], and
Wally Ring at Roger's offices. We sat down and went
through the history of the contract and leases, me
giving my side of it, and Wally Ring giving his side

of it, and in a rather amicable session I felt that
everybody had agreed that there would be some
compensation paid the Middleton family . . .
At any rate, we got the point made since then
that the only thing we are interested in is increasing
the income realized from the property in return for
which the Middleton family will agree not to challenge
the contract in court.
[R. 4126-4127, 4271-4272, 4282, 4357-4361; Plaintiff's Ex. 37].
The Prospective Economic Relationship is Destroyed
22.
Boyer

Before the meeting of September 26, 1989 broke up,

expressed,

as

he

had

previously

expressed

to

Anthony

Middleton, that the threats of litigation would not allow him to
go forward.

[R. 4134-4135].

Boyer Company

to withdraw

Clearly, those threats caused The

from the sublease.

The

litigation

threats were made notwithstanding the fact that the Middletons had
not been asked for any concessions and they knew very well that
their consent to the transaction was not required.

After the

September 26, 1989 meeting, every discussion related to the threats
of litigation, and Medical Leasing was forced to conduct a salvage
operation in an attempt to put back together the deal with The
Boyer

Company

Leasingfs

which

efforts

the

were

Middletons
unavailing

had
and

subverted.
after

that

Medical
all

the

discussions, which had previously narrowed to boiler plate clauses
of a draft sublease, instead centered on the threats of litigation
and the original deal was never retrieved.

[R. 4127-4129; 4132-

4133; 4542; 4656].
23.

On November 11, 1989, Boyer, Anthony Middleton and

Drs. Ring and Wong met at Boyer1 s home, in what was a continuing
effort by Medical Leasing to resolve the Middletons1 threats of
litigation.

However, at the meeting, Anthony Middleton would not
21

relent

and

in

fact repeated

his threat

Middletons were not compensated.
litigation

box;

Middletons would
Leasing would
threats

of

if he went

of

litigation

if the

Boyer stated that he was in a

forward

with

the

development

the

sue and if he refused to go forward Medical

sue.

Anthony Middleton would not withdraw

litigation.

[R.

5622-5627;

Defendants1

Ex.

the
27;

Plaintiff's Ex. 37].
24.

On November

17, 1989, in an effort to have the

Middletons take back their threats of litigation so the sublease
with The Boyer Company could proceed, Medical Leasing's attorney,
Parsons, sent a letter to Anthony Middleton demanding that the
litigation threats be withdrawn and that the Middletons execute a
Second
calling

Amended

Ground

Lease

expressly

containing

a

provision

for attornment and recognition, a right for The Boyer

Company to cure any default by Medical Leasing and an agreement to
give The Boyer Company a notice of default by Medical Leasing.
These concessions, not previously needed, were requested in the
hope that they would remedy the problems caused The Boyer Company
by the prior threats and would mitigate Medical Leasing1s damages.
[R. 4538; Plaintiff's Ex. 39].

Thereafter, on December 8, 1989,

Parsons sent a copy of the November

17 letter to Richard

P.

Middleton, requesting that he send copies to all of the Middletons.
The Middletons would not withdraw the threats.

[Defendants1 Ex.

32] .
25.

Parsons, on behalf of Medical Leasing, engaged in

various communications with George Hunt, attorney

for Anthony

Middleton, during December and January, 1990 in an attempt to
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persuade the Middletons to withdraw the threats and mitigate the
damages caused by their wrongful conduct.
Parsons

wrote

to

Mr.

Hunt

informing

On January 4, 1990,

him

that

unless

some

communication was received from the Middletons by January 15, 1990
regarding the assurances requested in Parsons1 December 8, 1989
letter, that Medical Leasing would proceed with litigation.

[R.

4546-4547; Plaintiff's Ex. 44].
The Boyer Company's Formal Withdrawal
26.

On February 5, 1990, Taylor wrote a letter on behalf

of The Boyer Company to Parsons on behalf of Medical

Leasing

informing Medical Leasing that The Boyer Company was not interested
in pursuing further negotiations with respect to the sublease until
such time as Medical Leasing was able to obtain the cooperation of
the Middletons
financiable."
27.
acknowledged,

"reasonably

necessary to make the Ground

Lease

[R. 4548-4549; Defendants1 Ex. 39].
Shortly

thereafter,

consistent

with

his

on

February

prior

15, 1990, Boyer

statements

that

only

threats of litigation would kill the deal, that the reason The
Boyer Company was backing off from the development was because of
the litigation threats.

Boyer stated, in a meeting with Medical

Leasing:
Well, we had, you know, Tony, he's called a
couple of times. In fact, he called me I think it was
last week and told me, I guess the essence of his
comment was, I feel more strongly about the strength
of my position, that almost is a direct quote, than
I have ever before, after having gotten into this,
which I honestly don't know how he could arrive at
that conclusion, but that is his conclusion.
. . .

We had a
suggested, and I
sent, but we are
this is a draft

discussion with Vic and he has
don't know, if they have even been
sending you a letter saying, look,
of it, saying, look, get your act
23

together, when we can make a deal, let's talk about
a deal. In the meantime, we're kind of stepping back.
[Defendants1 Ex. 58 at p. 4 ] .
Medical Leasing's Damages
28.

Absent the Middletons1 threats of litigation, The

Boyer Company could have financed the development of the Property
without

requiring

any

concessions

from the Middletons

or any

changes in the Amended Ground Lease between the Middletons and
Medical Leasing.

The Boyer Company was one of the best developers

in the business and the Property was one of the best commercial
locations in the valley.

The year 1989 was at the height of a boom

period in the commercial real estate finance industry.

Mr. Henry

Schwendiman, Medical Leasing's financing expert, concluded, after
reviewing all of the relevant factors and documents, that it was
more probable than not —
have

financed

the project

60/4 0 —

that The Boyer Company could

and that

if The Boyer

Company

had

accomplished a few routine steps such as execution of a sublease
and pre-leasing 30% of the project that, in his opinion, The Boyer
Company could certainly have obtained financing.
5148,

5080-5081,

5100-5101, 5119,

5107-5108].

[R. 5094, 5147Boyer

himself

expressed confidence from the beginning that The Boyer Company
could finance the project and said if Zions could do it so could
he [R. 4051-4052]; in fact, Boyer was so confident about financing
that he never even made financing a condition of signing a sublease
with Medical Leasing.

[Plaintiff's Ex. 22].

29. The uncontradicted evidence at trial demonstrated that
because of the wrongful litigation threats Medical Leasing lost a
unique opportunity for development of the Property and thereby
24

suffered millions of dollars in damages.
damages

presented

at

trial

was

the

The only evidence on

testimony

experts, Henry Schwendiman and Merrill Norman.
Schwendiman testified

of

Plaintiff's

In summary, Mr.

that because of the state of commercial

lending and the economy relating to commercial office space after
the Middletons torpedoed the deal with The Boyer Company, there
would

only

be

a remote

chance that a developer

could

obtain

financing for the development on Medical Leasing's ground lease
within the ten years following the trial and that because at the
end of ten years the remaining term of the Amended Ground Lease
would be insufficient to amortize the developer f s loan so the
developer could realize an adequate return on his investment, that
Medical Leasing would not be able to get a developer interested in
developing the Property in the future.
5136-5145].
Company

was

Middletons1

[R. 5100-5101, 5124-5127,

Thus, Medical Leasing's transaction with The Boyer
an

opportunity

threats

of

which

was

litigation.

As

lost
a

because

result, Mr.

of

the

Norman

prepared a detailed damage study with precise calculations which
supported his testimony that Medical Leasing was damaged in the
amount of $2,582,780.00, representing, inter alia, the present
value of the rent which Medical Leasing would have received from
The Boyer Company under the proposed sublease.

[Plaintiff's Ex.

47].
30.

The damage evidence of Medical Leasing was entirely

unrebutted by the Middletons.

[R. 5218-5220; Plaintiff's Ex. 47].

In fact, opposing counsel argued that no development could occur
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under Medical Leasing1s Amended Ground Lease then or at any time.
[R. 4258].

V.
OBJECTIONS TO THE MIDDLETONS1 STATEMENTS OF FACT

Medical

Leasing

specifically

objects

to

the

following

"facts" set forth in the Middletons1 Statements of Facts:
1.

The Middletons state that they signed the Amended

Ground Lease separately as "Landlord".

[Williams & Hunt Brief, p.

10; Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 7 ] . This is a mischaracterization.
In fact, the Middletons were referred to in the Amended Ground
Lease collectively

as the

"Landlord"

Amended Ground Lease in that capacity.
2.

and all

signed

the same

[Plaintiff's Ex. 3 ] .

The Middletons claim that they believed they would be

able to participate in further development of the Property because
they understood that if Medical Leasing subleased any portion of
the Property that the developer's lender would very likely insist
that the Middletons subordinate their fee ownership interest to the
lender's lien and that if Medical Leasing asked for consent or
subordination for development, they could rightly ask for more
income on the lease in return.
The

Middletons

cite

pages

[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 10].

4998-5004

following 5701 of the record.
evidence

is

irrelevant

and

the

unnumbered

page

Aside from the fact that this

because

no

one

asked

them

subordination, the record does not support these claims.

for

the

In fact,

the cited portions of the record dealt for the most part with
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Richard P. Middleton's goals and expectations for the Property in
years past and not at the time of the transaction with The Boyer
Company.

There is testimony that Anthony and Richard G. Middleton

thought that if subordination or some other changes were required
to make the project

feasible, then they ought to be able to

participate, but not that subordination or other changes would be
required.
3.

The Middletons claim that Zions insisted that they

expressly consent to the Zions sublease.

[Williams & Hunt Brief,

p. 11; Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 8 ] . In fact, Zions requested that
the Middletons

either

acknowledge

that

their

consent

was

not

necessary for the construction of a branch bank on the Property or,
in

the

alternative,

construction.

that

the

Middletons

consent

to

such

[R. 4010-4016, 4026-4050; Plaintiffs Exs. 7, 8 and

9].
4.

The Middletons

state:

"The Amended

Ground

Lease

specifically states the Middletons are not required to give further
consent or subordination for development, but that such consent is
'solely

at

misstatement.

Landlord's

discretion.'"

This

is

[Moyle & Draper Brief, pp. 7-8].

a

blatant

The restated

paragraph 8 doesn't say the Middletons aren't required to give
consent.

What it really says is, "consent of the Middletons to

future development of the leased premises is not required" unless
subordination is required.

And far from suggesting that their

consent is "solely at the Landlord's discretion", the revision
struck that language and, to make sure of its meaning, stated:
other words

. . .

a third party sublessee
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. . .

"In

may further

develop the property without the consent of the Middletons. . . ."
[Plaintiff's Ex. 16, pp. 4-5].
5.

Counsel

for Anthony Middleton suggests that Boyer

testified that items requested by Taylor were necessary to obtain
financing and that such testimony was unimpeached.
Hunt Brief, pp. 36-37].2

[Williams &

Characteristically, the Middletons ignore

the portions of the record favorable to the position of Medical
Leasing.

For example, Ring testified that in fact Boyer stated he

was not concerned with the points brought up by Taylor.
4121].

Moreover,

Boyer

financing was available.
6.

testified

at trial

that

he

[R. 4119believed

[R. 4843].

The Middletons claim that in May, 1989, "In an effort

to mollify" Medical Leasing that The Boyer Company asked Bonneville
Mortgage Company if financing could be arranged. [Williams & Hunt
Brief, p. 14]. The evidence was that this request was not made "in
an effort to mollify" Medical

Leasing, but because The Boyer

Company was anticipating developing a project on the Property.

[R.

5396].
7.

The Middletons state that Greg Bell advised The Boyer

Company that, "The proposed transaction was likely too complicated
to be financed at all."

[Williams & Hunt Brief, pp. 14-15; Moyle

& Draper Brief, pp. 11-12].

However, Mr. Bell admitted at trial,

inter alia, that he never took the transaction to a lender or
reviewed any proformas or site plans and that he is not involved
in the application process or in negotiating financing.

Mr. Bell

The testimony of Boyer cited by Middletons was singularly unpersuasive as counsel simply asked one
blanket question concerning all the positions taken by counsel in a letter, without asking the witness for
either his recollection or position with respect to specific statements or issues.
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further acknowledged that in his letter upon which the Middletons
rely [Defendants1 Ex. 18] that he had expressed that he did not
know whether or not lenders would finance the proposed project.
[R. 5364-5381].

The Middletons also neglect evidence that Boyer

told Medical Leasing that he did not agree with Mr. Bell's letter.
[R. 4115-4121, 4422-4424].
8.

The Middletons state that Boyer contacted

Anthony

Middleton to seek assurance that the Middletons would not sue.
[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 16].

The evidence was that Boyer did

not ask Anthony Middleton during that meeting for any assurance
that the Middletons would not sue, but only wanted to know what the
Middletons1 opinion was with respect to development of the Property
by The Boyer Company.
9.

[R. 5530-5531].

The Middletons assert that at a meeting on August 7 or

8, 1989 that Boyer told Anthony Middleton that Boyer's lawyers were
of the opinion that the Middletons1
needed and that Boyer agreed.
& Draper Brief, p. 13].

consent to a sublease was

[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 16; Moyle

The Middletons rely solely upon Anthony

Middleton's testimony while being examined by his attorney.

In

fact, Anthony Middleton could not recall whether this claimed
statement was made at the August 7 or 8 meeting or at the September
26, 1989 meeting.

[R. 5601-5602].

The jury obviously was not

bound to accept this self-serving testimony, especially in light
of the substantial contravening proof which the Middletons failed
to marshal.
10.

[R. 4348-4349, 5601-5603].
The Middletons relate certain events of the meeting

between Boyer and Anthony Middleton on August 7 or 8, 1989 by
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saying, "But Boyer did not tell Anthony the specifics of why his
lawyer

said

Middletons1

consent

was

necessary,

nor

of

the

concessions necessary to make the sublease financiable."3 What they
leave out is Anthony Middleton!s own testimony that he issued
threats of litigation to Boyer at this first meeting stating that
the Middletons would have to be part of any development project.
[R. 4353].
11.

The Middletons claim that Medical Leasing knew during

the meetings with Anthony Middleton

in September, October and

November, 1989 that he did not have authority to speak for the rest
of the Middletons, citing pages 4460-4461 of the record.
& Draper Brief, p. 17].

[Moyle

This reference does not support that

claim.
12.
1989,

The Middletons refer to the fact that on November 17,

Medical Leasing's attorney, Mr. Parsons, wrote to Anthony

Middleton threatening suit if certain actions were not taken and
that when Anthony Middleton f s

lawyer asked

for a copy of the

proposed sublease to consider approving it, Medical Leasing refused
to provide it unless the Middletons first agreed not to ask for
more rent and not to sue.

[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 18; Moyle &

Draper Brief, p. 18]. In fact, the November 17, 1989 letter also
demanded that the Middletons withdraw their threats of litigation.
[Plaintiff's Ex. 39]. The Middletons also ignore that at the very
time Anthony Middleton f s

lawyer was asking

for a copy of the

proposed sublease to supposedly consider approving it, the lawyer

In that regard, the Middletons confirm that nothing was asked of Anthony Middleton when Boyer first
spoke with him about the project.
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already in fact had a copy of the sublease in his possession,
having received it from Greg Gardner on or about December 22, 1989.
The Middletons were simply using Medical Leasing's reluctance to
give them a copy of the sublease as a pretext to refuse consent and
to continue their threats and demands.

[R. 4693-4697; Plaintiff's

Ex. 43].
13.

The Middletons argue that the Amended Ground Lease

provides that a party is not in default until thirty days after
written notice from the other party specifying the particulars in
which a party has failed to perform and that no such notice was
given to any of the Middletons.

[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 19;

Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 19]. Both these statements are incorrect.
The Amended Ground Lease provides that after a party gives a thirty
day notice of default which is not complied with, that party can
then incur expenses in performing the defaulting party's duties
under the agreement.

The provision specifically provides that it

does not preclude any remedies provided by law.
3].

[Plaintiff's Ex.

Moreover, notice was given to Anthony Middleton by letter

dated November 17, 1989 [Plaintiff's Ex. 39] and to Richard P.
Middleton and all the other Middletons by letter dated December 8,
1989, which enclosed

a copy of the November

17, 1989 letter.

[Defendants' Ex. 32].
14.

The Middletons state that Boyer testified that Medical

Leasing's attorney never changed his mind about whether the items
mentioned by Taylor in his March 14, 1989 letter would have to be
addressed,

that

he

had

no

recollection

of

Anthony

Middleton

threatening to sue him or The Boyer Company, and that Boyer agreed
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with his attorney's letter of February 5, 1990 that Medical Leasing
had

been

unable

to

obtain

the

necessary

cooperation

of

landowner in order to make the ground lease financiable.
& Draper Brief, pp. 20-21].

the

[Moyle

This is entirely misleading and cannot

withstand even a modest marshaling of the evidence. The Middletons
ignore the evidence favorable to Medical Leasing which demonstrated
that Boyer clearly stated that the concerns raised by Taylor were
not a problem and that the only thing that would keep the deal from
going

forward

was

Boyer1s

concern

about

litigation

from

the

Middletons, that by his own admission Anthony Middleton threatened
litigation and that the threatened

litigation was exactly the

reason The Boyer Company withdrew

from the proposed sublease.

[See, e.g. , R. 4116-4122, 4531-4536, 4888-4894, 4347-4354, 42714272, 4357-4361; Defendants1 Ex. 27].
15.

The Middletons remarkably contend that the evidence

that The Boyer Company did not proceed with the project because
Medical Leasing "did not provide a ground lease in form suitable
to Boyer was uncontradicted."

[Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 21]. The

record citations set forth in paragraph 11 above and in paragraphs
19-27 of Medical Leasingfs Statement of Facts, supra, lay bare this
frivolous claim.

There was, in fact, overwhelming evidence that

The Boyer Company walked from the transaction solely because of
the threats of groundless litigation.

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The evidence admitted regarding the Zions Litigation
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was highly relevant and admissible. The evidence was not precluded
by

the

terms

of

the

Stipulation

and

Mutual

Release

and

it

demonstrated, inter alia, that the groundless threats of litigation
by Anthony Middleton were known to be groundless even when the
claims underlying those threats were made in the Zions Litigation.
Further, the Stipulation and Mutual Release in the Zions Litigation
had to be introduced because it contained a material amendment to
the lease.

In any case, no evidence of the Zions Litigation was

admitted to demonstrate liability in connection with the Zions
claim, the only basis for exclusion under Rule 408 Utah Rules of
Evidence. Medical Leasing's counsel did not mislead the court with
respect to the purpose for admitting this evidence.
2. Written notice to the Middletons was not a precondition
to filing a suit for damages and, in any case, such notice was
given.

Paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease only calls for

notice before a party can incur expenses to perform the other
parties' obligation.

The paragraph expressly retains all other

remedies, which includes suits for damages.

Moreover, Medical

Leasing, in fact, gave written notice specifying the harm that
Anthony Middleton was inflicting upon it and demanding a withdrawal
of the threats.
3.

There

was

substantial

evidence

showing

that

the

Middletons breached both the express provisions of paragraph 8 of
the Amended Ground Lease and the implied obligation of good faith
and fair dealing.

Paragraph 8 clearly allowed Medical Leasing to

sublease to another entity for the development of the Property and
the jury found that the groundless threats of litigation issued by
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Anthony Middleton were made for the express and dominant purpose
of interfering with that right•

The same activities breached the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the Middletons
well knew that Medical Leasing had the right to sublease for
development without their consent. No one asked the Middletons for
anything before the threats of litigation were issued and they were
issued

with

interfere.

knowledge

that

the

Middletons

had

no

right

to

All the Middletons share joint liability for breach

of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as their liability
arises from the express provisions of the contract which were
breached.
4.
Middletons1

The

overwhelming

wrongful

evidence

threats

of

transaction with The Boyer Company.

demonstrated

litigation

that

the

destroyed

the

The Middletons make no effort

to marshal the evidence which demonstrated that Medical Leasing
had a reasonable probability that the sublease would be executed
and that the wrongful threats, made maliciously and intentionally
by

Anthony

Middleton

for

the

purpose

transaction, had the intended effect.
for

anything,

Anthony

Middleton

of

sabotaging

that

Without having been asked

knowingly

issued

threats

of

litigation which were groundless, which The Boyer Company received
and which caused The Boyer Company to withdraw.
5.

The trial court properly awarded Medical Leasing its

attorney's fees, in accordance with the stipulation between the
parties, whether the acts of the Middletons constituted a breach
of the express terms of the Amended Ground Lease or a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or both.
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6. The Middletons are jointly liable for the breach of the
Amended

Ground

Lease

having

each

signed

as

"Landlord11

the

undertaking the same obligations and promising the same performance
to Medical Leasing.
7. The jury properly awarded Medical Leasing lost profits
through

the

remaining

term

of the Amended

Ground

Lease

in

accordance with the undisputed evidence which demonstrated that
Medical Leasing had permanently lost the opportunity to sublease
the Property for development. Not only did the Middletons fail to
counter that evidence, they sought to prove by expert testimony
that

Medical

Leasing

could

not

sublease

the

Property

for

development either then or in the future.
8.

The jury verdict that Anthony Middleton tortiously

interfered with Medical Leasing's prospective relationship with The
Boyer Company was supported by substantial, if not overwhelming,
evidence.

The evidence, including his own admissions and diary

entries, showed, and the jury

found, that Anthony Middleton

intentionally

issued

and

maliciously

groundless

threats

of

litigation for the dominant purpose of destroying the prospective
business opportunity between Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company.
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VII.
ARGUMENT

A.
LITIGATION

THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL REGARDING THE ZIONS
WAS

HIGHLY

RELEVANT

AND

ITS

ADMISSION

WAS

NOT

PREJUDICIAL ERROR,

The Middletons

argue that the trial

court

committed

prejudicial error by receiving into evidence testimony, pleadings
and correspondence regarding the previous Zions Litigation because
this evidence was supposedly inadmissible under the terms of the
Stipulation and Mutual Release of Claims entered into in settlement
of the Zions Litigation and the case law on the effect of
settlement agreements.4 The Middletons1 position is without merit.
In the first place, the Middletons are barred from arguing
on appeal that this evidence was inadmissible under the terms of
the settlement stipulation and the case law regarding the effect
of settlement because that was not the basis upon which they
objected to the evidence at trial.5

Meyers v. SLC Corp. . 747 P. 2d

Inconsistently, the Middletons admit that evidence of the Stipulation and Mutual Release, Order of
Dismissal and Findings of Fact was properly admitted. [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 22, fn. 13]. It should also
be noted that it was the Middletons themselves who first referred to the Zions Litigation in their Motion for
Summary Judgment [R. 454]. The Middletons also introduced evidence at trial concerning the Zions Litigation.
Prior to trial, the Middletons filed Motions in Limine to exclude evidence of the Zions Litigation
[R. 1215-1221], asserting only that the evidence was irrelevant and that the final judgment in the Zions
Litigation was res judicata and the "pleadings, claims and circumstances" of that case "merged into a final
judgment and order." CR. 1215-1221]. Judge Rigtrup denied the motions. At trial, the only objection raised
by the Middletons to evidence of the Zions Litigation was irrelevance. [See, e.g., R. 4038 and 4042]. Mr. Hunt
later objected to the admission of the Third Party Complaint filed on behalf of Anthony and George Middleton
and the Answer and Counterclaim filed by the other Middletons in the Zions Litigation [Plaintiff's Exs. 11 and
15] on the additional basis that those specific pleadings were irrelevant and had been merged into the final
judgment.
Finally, long after all parties had introduced evidence concerning the Zions Litigation, Mr. Palmer
moved to strike all of that evidence on the basis that the evidence was irrelevant and "potentially inflammatory
with the jury." [R. 5101-5102].
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1058, 1060 (Utah App. 1987); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Gaulden v. Burlington Northern. Inc.. 654
P.2d 383, 393 (Kan. 1982).
More

importantly,

the

evidence

was

highly

relevant.

Medical Leasing contended that the Middletons intentionally and in
bad faith interfered with Medical Leasing1s relationship with The
Boyer Company by making threats of groundless litigation based upon
claims

that

they

were

entitled

to participate

in

any

future

development.
To prove these contentions, Medical

Leasing

introduced

evidence that the Middletons had made the very same claims when
Medical Leasing proposed to sublease a portion of the Property to
Zions, including claims that the Amended Ground Lease was ambiguous
regarding whether their consent was necessary and that, in fact,
their consent was required.

The evidence presented at trial

demonstrated that the Middletons knew full well at the time they
were litigating the Zions case that their claims were groundless.
[See, e.g. , R. 4013-4020, 5031-5032, 5693-5700, 4324-4338, 55785584].

After Judge Billings ruled on summary judgment that the

Middletons1 consent was not required, the parties ultimately in
1985 settled all disputes in the Zions Litigation by way of a
Stipulation and Mutual Release of Claims and Order of Dismissal,
one of the basic purposes of which was to make crystal clear the
already clear and well understood language of paragraph 8 of the
Amended Ground Lease that consent was not required for further
development of the Property by an independent third party.

37

In this connection, the Stipulation and Mutual Release in
the Zions Litigation had to be introduced

into evidence below

because paragraph 5 of that document modified paragraph 8 of the
Amended Ground Lease as follows:
Consent of the Middletons to the future development
of the Leased Premises is not required unless the
Lessee shall seek to develop the property or an
independent sublessee or assignee requires that the
interest of the Middletons be subordinated to the
interest of a development lender. In other words,
the lessee may not develop the property without the
consent of the Middletons, but a third party
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the
lessee may further develop the property without the
consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed
capital provided subordination of the interest of
the
Middletons
is
not
required
for
said
development.
[Plaintifffs Ex. 16] .
The evidence concerning the Zions Litigation was not
introduced below to show that the Middletons were liable for the
claims made in the Zions Litigation, which is the only purpose
for which Rule 4 08 of the Utah Rules of Evidence would have
prohibited introduction of that evidence. See, e.g., Bituminous
Const., Inc. v. Rucker Enterprises, Inc., 816 F.2d 965 (4th Cir.
1987) ; Wiener v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis, 759 F. Supp.
510, 521 (E.D.Ark. 1991); Vulcan Hart Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 718 F.2d 269, 277 (8th Cir. 1983); Skonberg v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 576 N.E.2d 28, 34 (111. App.
1991); Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex. App. 1991);
Bulaich v. AT&T Information Systems, 778 P.2d
(Wash. 1989).

1031, 1036-37

The Middletons1 notion that by settling their

groundless claims

in one lawsuit they can prevent

evidence

thereof in a second lawsuit on the issues of knowledge, intent
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and purpose flies in the face not only of the specific language
of Rule 408 permitting such evidence, but of common sense.
Further, the Middletons1 contention that the language of
the Stipulation and Mutual Release of Claims barred Medical
Leasing from introducing this evidence is wrong.
such language.

There is no

Nor do the cases cited by the Middletons support

their position.

Not one of those cases holds that the mere fact

that the parties signed a release of claims in settlement of
litigation bars evidence concerning that litigation in future
litigation on other claims.6
Finally, the Middletons1 charge that Medical Leasing's
counsel misled Judge Rigtrup at the commencement of the trial
concerning the purpose for the admission of evidence relating
to

the

Zions

disingenuous.

Litigation

is

not

only

insulting,

it

is

The Middletons take out of context a passage from

the transcript in which Medical Leasing's counsel stated to the
court that he wanted to make it clear that no claims were being
made in this litigation relating to the Zions Litigation and
that "we are simply trying to show what the contentions are so

For example, in Kirby v. Dole, 736 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1984), cited by the Middletons, the Eleventh
Circuit merely held that the employees decision to invoke the term of the settlement agreement permitting him
one remedy necessarily precluded him from asserting whatever other remedies might have been available. The
case had nothing to do with the admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings.
In Rasmussen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 726 P.2d 1251 (Wash.App. 1986), cited by the Middletons,
the insurance company for a car rental agency settled a claim with an injured passenger. The release included
a release of any claims for underinsured motorist benefits. The court simply held that the release was binding
on the issue of the scope of coverage in subsequent litigation between the rental car insurer and the
passenger's insurance company. Again, there was no issue concerning the admissibility of evidence in subsequent
litigation.
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we can understand what was settled."7

The Middletons neglect to

bring to the court's attention that this statement was made only
with respect to the introduction of Exhibit 10, the complaint
filed by Zions against the Middletons and Medical Leasing, and
only after the exhibit had been admitted and the jury had been
cautioned by the court that the allegations of the Complaint had
not been proven.

As the Middletons well know, that statement

was not intended as an exhaustive list of the reasons for which
all

evidence

introduced.8

concerning

the

Zions

Litigation

would

be

Judge Rigtrup was not misled; he was well informed

and ruled correctly.
In short, evidence concerning the Zions Litigation was
not introduced to prove that the Middletons were liable for the
claims made in the Zions Litigation.

This evidence, together

with all the other evidence presented at trial, persuasively
demonstrated

that

the

Middletons

knew

very

well

that

the

litigation threatened by Anthony Middleton was groundless and
that the repeat of the same threats of groundless litigation as
were made in the Zions Litigation was an intentional wrong,
justifying not only compensatory, but punitive damages.

The Middletons cite page 4115 of the record in error. In fact, this statement is contained at page 4039
of the record.

In fact, both the court and counsel had well in mind the arguments made by Medical Leasing's
counsel in opposition to the Middletons' Motion in Limine to exclude this evidence which were set forth at
length in Medical Leasing's memorandum in opposition to the Motion in Limine. CR. 1242, 1246-1250]. Medical
Leasing argued the evidence was admissible at that time on the same basis that Medical Leasing now contends the
evidence was admissible.
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B.

MEDICAL LEASING WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE WRITTEN

NOTICE OF DEFAULT IN ORDER TO RECOVER DAMAGES AND, IN ANY EVENT,
SUFFICIENT NOTICE WAS GIVEN,

The Middletons attempt to avoid the judgment entered
against them by raising the argument that Medical Leasing was
barred from bringing suit because Medical Leasing purportedly
failed to give written notice of default which the Middletons
say was required under paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease
and under the law.

1.

The Middletons are wrong on both counts.

Notice Was Not a Condition Precedent.

First,

the

law

is

clear

that

absent

an

express

contractual provision making the giving of notice a condition
precedent to filing suit, no notice is necessary.

See, e.g. ,

Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 190 A.2d 369, 373-74 (N.J.
1973); S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 727
at 395 (3rd Ed. 1957).

Paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease

in the present case contains no such provision.9
Paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease provides:
Paragraph 6. Default. A party shall be deemed
to be in default upon the expiration of thirty (30)
days from the date of written notice from the other
party specifying the particulars in which such party

The Middletons note that earlier in this case Medical Leasing unsuccessfully sought to exclude evidence
of Middletons' attorney's fees on the basis that since no notice of default had been given by the Middletons,
Medical Leasing could not be a "defaulting party." That argument, which was rejected by the court, related to
the specific definition of "defaulting party" under the attorney's fee provision of paragraph 16. Further, the
Middletons do not point out to the court that their understanding of paragraphs 6 and 16 has changed. In
response to Medical Leasing's Motion in Limine, they argued that paragraph 6 did not bar them from recovery of
attorney's fees even if no notice had been given, and further that their pleadings in this lawsuit constituted
sufficient notice under paragraph 6. [R. 1261-1264],
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has failed to perform the obligations of this Lease
unless that party, prior to the expiration of said
thirty (30) days, has rectified the particulars
specified in the notice. Upon such default occurring,
the defaulting party may incur any expenses necessary
to perform the obligation of the other party as
specified in such notice, and if the defaulting party
is the landlord, tenant may deduct such expenses from
the rents thereafter to become due. If the defaulting
party is the tenant, landlord may decree the term
ended and enter the Leased Premises with or without
process of law.
The remedies in this article
conferred do not exclude any other remedies provided
in the Lease or by law. [Emphasis added].
As Judge Rigtrup found, the clear import of paragraph 6 is
only to require written notice of default before the non-defaulting
party may incur expenses necessary to perform the obligation of the
other party as specified in the notice or before the Middletons
could

terminate

conditioned.

the

lease.

Those

are

the

only

remedies

so

Paragraph 6 clearly states that it does not "exclude

any other remedies provided in the Lease or by law.11

No provision

of the Amended Ground Lease requires formal written notice of
default before commencement of a suit for damages.
The Middletons argue that a contract should be interpreted
so as to harmonize all of its provisions, a truism with which
Medical Leasing agrees.

Having said this, the Middletons then

attempt to interpret paragraph 6 in such a manner as to entirely
read out of the lease the last sentence of the paragraph.

The

language of the lease and specifically paragraph 6 is readily
harmonized by only requiring that a party give a written notice of
default before a party seeks to hold the other party responsible
for expenses incurred by the non-breaching party in performing the
breaching partyfs obligations or before the landlord terminates the
lease.
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The Middletons rely on Bentley v. Potter, 694 P. 2d 617
(Utah 1984), to support their notice argument.

Bentley is not on

point because, unlike the present case, there the lease clearly
required a written notice of default before the lease could be
terminated.

The Middletons1 reliance on Hadlock v. Showcase Real

Estate, Inc. , 680 P.2d 395 (Utah 1984), is similarly misplaced.
In Hadlock, paragraph

16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract

specifically required five days prior written notice before the
seller could forfeit the buyer's interest in the property.

Again,

there is no such requirement in the case at bar.
Unable to find any case law to support their argument that
notice was required, the Middletons seek to rely upon § 7.1 of the
Restatement (Second) of Property.

All that section states is that

if a landlord fails to perform certain promises contained in a
lease after being requested to do so by the tenant, then the tenant
has specific remedies.
circumstances

That section has nothing to do with the

of this case.

Moreover, that section does not

require written notice from a tenant and the record is replete with
evidence that both Boyer and Medical
Anthony

Middleton

to

acknowledge

Leasing orally

Medical

requested

Leasingfs

right

to

sublease to Boyer.
Finally, it would be folly to bar Medical Leasing from suit
for lack of notice where the Middletons made no effort to retract
their

litigation

threats

after

suit was

undeniably on notice of their default.
notice made no difference.
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filed

and

they

Any perceived

were

lack of

2.

In Any Event, Medical Leasing Gave Notice.

Furthermore, even if written notice had been required, the
plain fact of the matter is that Medical Leasing did give the
Middletons the very notice they
receive.

assert they were entitled

to

The Middletons argue that Medical Leasing was required

to give that notice in writing to Richard P. Middleton, who was the
individual to whom rent was payable. On November 17, 1989, Medical
Leasingfs attorney, Mr. Parsons, sent Anthony Middleton a letter
demanding, among other things, that the threats of
against The Boyer Company be withdrawn.
Thereafter,

on December

8,

litigation

[Plaintiff's Ex. 39].

1989, Parsons

sent a copy

of the

November 17 letter to Richard P. Middleton (the very individual
whom the Middletons now contend was required to be given notice)
requesting

that

[Defendants'
numerous

Ex.

he

forward

32].

communications

copies

to

Notwithstanding
between

counsel

all

of

this
and

the Middletons.
notice,

the

and

the

parties, the

Middletons refused to withdraw their threats of litigation either
within thirty days or thereafter.
In short, the Middletons1 attempt to hide behind the lack
of a formal written notice of default is not supported by the
provisions of the lease, the applicable law or the facts, and was
properly rejected by the trial court.
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C.

THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE MIDDLETONS

BREACHED PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE AMENDED GROUND LEASE AND THEIR IMPLIED
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

The Middletons insist that the judgment below was erroneous
because they did not breach the express provisions of paragraph 8
of the Amended Ground Lease or the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and that, in any event, a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing does not give rise to joint liability.
These arguments are made out of whole cloth.
Initially, it should be noted that here, as elsewhere in
their briefs, the Middletons attempt to attack the sufficiency of
the evidence below without complying with their obligation to
marshal all of the evidence and inferences supporting the judgment
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support
the

judgment.

judgment.

That

failure

is grounds

alone

to

affirm

the

See, e.g. , Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839

(Utah 1992); Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991).

1.

There Was Substantial Evidence that the Middletons

Breached the Provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease.

Paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease as restated in the
stipulation for settlement in the Zions Litigation provides:
[C]onsent of the Middletons to the future development
of the Leased Premises is not required unless the
Lessee shall seek to develop the property or an
independent third party sublessee or assignee requires
that the interest of the Middletons be subordinated
to the interest of a development lender.
In other
words, the lessee may not develop the property without
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the consent of the Middletons, but a third party
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the
lessee may further develop the property without the
consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed
capital provided subordination of the interest of the
Middletons is not required for said development.
Incredibly, the Middletons now assert that because no
affirmative action was required from the Middletons under paragraph
8 that the Middletons did not, under paragraph 8, "promise to do
anything and they did not promise not to do anything."

Thus, so

say the Middletons, they could not have breached the express
provisions of paragraph 8.

This argument is pure sophistry.

The Middletons agreed in paragraph 8 that Medical Leasing
could sublease the property to an independent third party such as
The Boyer Company to develop without further compensation and
without any consent from the Middletons.
to and breach of paragraph

In direct contravention

8, Anthony Middleton maliciously

threatened groundless suit to stop the development unless the
Middletons received tribute.
attempting

to

stop

Anthony Middleton's conduct in

the development

breached

the Middletons1

affirmative agreement that Medical Leasing could sublease the
property to a third party for development.

The situation is no

different in principle than if the Middletons had agreed to allow
development of the Property and then destroyed the buildings
constructed. Would the Middletons defend by insisting they had not
affirmatively agreed to do or not to do anything? Understandably,
the Middletons can find neither logic nor case authority to support
their position.
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2.

There Was Substantial Evidence that the Covenant of

Good Faith and Fair Dealing Was Breached,

Perhaps the most frivolous argument made by the Middletons
on this appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to show that
there was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing because Anthony Middleton's conduct in threatening Medical
Leasing with suit for more rent "was consistent with both parties1
expectations that to get further consent or lease changes, more
rent had to be paid . . . "

[Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 45].

This

argument is a gross distortion of the record.
The language of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease as
restated in the settlement stipulation in the Zions Litigation
quoted above is absolutely clear that Medical Leasing was entitled
to sublease the Property to an independent third party developer
such as The Boyer Company for development without the consent of
the Middletons and without compensation so long as no subordination
was requested.

Anthony Middleton himself, in his August 6, 1989

diary entry, demonstrated his understanding of that fact:
Roger's company is so strong that they can do without
subordination and I suspect we are dead in the water
the way that stupid contract is put together by Uncle
Dick and William Morel . . . [M]y strong hunch is that
we are sunk and will have to live with the idea that
those birds will derive a very handsome income off the
development without actually including the actual
owners of the land at all.
[Plaintiff's Ex. 37].
Indeed, Anthony Middleton never contended that under the
Amended Ground Lease the Middletons1 consent was necessary; he
simply asserted the Middletons1 philosophical belief that they were
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entitled to compensation and would litigate unless they got it.
The evidence also demonstrated that the other Middletons, including
George, Richard
consent

was

compensation.

P. and Richard G.,

not

necessary

and

all understood

they

were

not

that their
entitled

to

What the evidence proved was that the Middletons

did not like the bargain they had made in the Amended Ground Lease
and were bound and determined not to honor it.
It is well settled in Utah that a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is implied in contractual relationships.

This

covenant requires that the parties act in good faith to achieve
the purposes of the contract and not purposely do anything to
deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract.

See,

e.g., St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194
(Utah 1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1046
(Utah 1989); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,
311 (Utah 1982).
The Middletons argue that Anthony Middleton's threats were
justified because Boyer supposedly told him that Boyer's lawyer
said

the Middletons1

consent was

required

and

therefore

that

Anthony Middleton at the time he made the threats believed the
Middletons

would

at

a

later

date

be

requested

concession or change the Amended Ground Lease.
unavailing for at least three reasons.
actually

testified

that

the

basis

to

give

some

This argument is

First, Anthony Middleton
for

his

threats

was

a

"philosophical belief" that the Middletons should get a cut of
future development and had nothing to do with whether requests were
or were not made of them.

Second, with the substantial conflict
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in his testimony, the jury was not required to nor did it believe
all or any portion of Anthony Middleton's testimony.

Third, no one

asked Anthony for any concessions before he started making his
threats of litigation and, in fact, it was made clear to Anthony
that no concessions were being requested.

The Middletons attempt

in this regard to distort Dr. Wong's testimony that it was his
expectation that if Medical Leasing asked for consent or changes
from the Middletons that the Middletons would ask for more rent.
The plain truth of the matter is that Medical Leasing did not
believe the Middletons1 consent to development was necessary and
did not ask for any consent or changes from the Middletons before
the

transaction

with

The

Boyer

Company

was

sabotaged

by

the

litigation threats.
Finally, the Middletons argue that
necessary,

then

Medical

Leasing

and

Boyer

if consent was not
had

no

"business

approaching Anthony on the subject to make the specious "request
for assurance of no suit . . . '" and that this request caused
Anthony to be suspicious and to threaten suit.
Brief, p. 45].
rejected it.
consent

was

transaction.

[Moyle & Draper

That, of course, is argument for the jury, which

The jury found that Anthony Middleton knew very well
not

required

and

intentionally

sabotaged

the

Of course, Medical Leasing did not approach Anthony

to request an assurance that the Middletons would not sue. Nor did
Boyer.

Boyer was aware, however, of the previous Zions Litigation

and because of concerns prompted thereby simply inquired of Anthony
Middleton

concerning

development.

the

Middletons1

feelings

on

further

And there was no evidence presented that before
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Anthony Middleton issued the threats Boyer asked for assurances the
Middletons would not sue.

Beyond that, the Middletons were not

sued because they refused to give an assurance that they would not
commence a lawsuit.

They were sued because Anthony Middleton

affirmatively threatened groundless litigation, thereby destroying
the transaction with The Boyer Company.

3.

The Middletons Are Jointly Liable for the Breach of

the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

The Middletons represented by Moyle & Draper argue that
even if the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached
by Anthony Middleton, that such a breach would not impose joint
liability on the remaining Middletons.

They quote from 3A Corbin

on Contracts, § 654A (1991 Pocket Part at 81), that the obligation
of good faith is "constructive" rather than "implied" and cite §
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, that the covenant is
imposed upon each party to the contract, to argue that unlike other
breaches of contract, the breach of the obligation of good faith
does not impose joint liability.

This argument is a non sequitur.

The authorities relied upon by the Middletons have absolutely
nothing to do with this issue.

In this regard, Cluff v. Culmer,

556 P. 2d 498 (Utah 1976), cited by the Middletons, provides no
support whatsoever.

That case, although holding both sellers of

real estate liable for an implied covenant against waste (without
any reference to who actually committed it) , contains no discussion
at all of joint liability.
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The Middletons have cited no cases for the proposition that
the

rules

of

joint

liability

for breach

of contract

are any

different for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
than any other breach and Medical Leasing has, not surprisingly,
been unable to find any such cases. The law imposes the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing as part of the contract between the
parties.

The covenant has to do with how the parties perform their

obligations under the contract. As will be demonstrated later [pp.
73 to 83], all of the Middletons, as the Landlord under the Amended
Ground Lease, are jointly liable for the breach of that contract.
It would be illogical to treat the breach of this covenant any
different from other breaches of contract.

D.

THE EVIDENCE WAS OVERWHELMING THAT THE MIDDLETONS1

WRONGFUL THREATS OF LITIGATION DESTROYED THE TRANSACTION WITH THE
BOYER COMPANY.

The Middletons once again raise the evidentiary argument,
soundly rejected by both the jury and the court below, that there
is no substantial evidence that Anthony Middleton's threats of
litigation were the cause of The Boyer Company's refusal to go
forward with the sublease of the Property.

Rather, the Middletons

posit, the real reason The Boyer Company refused to go forward was
that

it supposedly

could not obtain

financing

for development

without concessions from the Middletons which the Middletons were
not required to give under their Amended Ground Lease with Medical
Leasing.

This question of causation was a question of fact for the
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jury and the jury

found from a preponderance of the evidence

against the Middletons.
In reasserting this argument on appeal, the Middletons
attempt to reduce the body of evidence to small selected bits of
testimony,

all

removed

immaterial to the point.

from

context,

and

for

the

most

part

At the same time, the Middletons ignore

all the remaining testimony given at trial, failing once again to
marshal the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be derived
therefrom supporting the jury's verdict.
In order to recover damages from the Middletons, Medical
Leasing was not required to prove beyond any doubt that it would
have entered into a sublease with Boyer for development of the
Property or that Anthony Middleton's wrongful threats of litigation
were the sole proximate cause of Boyerfs decision not to go forward
with the project.

Rather, Medical Leasing was only required to

demonstrate that absent the wrongful threats there was a reasonable
probability that a sublease would have been executed and that the
wrongful threats were a substantial factor in Boyerfs decision not
to go forward with the project.

Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal

Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979); Caruso v. Local Union No. 690,
Etc., 653 P.2d 638, 643 (Wash. App. 1982); Prosser & Keeton on The
Law of Torts, § 129 at 989 (5th Ed. 1984).

As this Court remarked

in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah
1982) :
The tort of intentional interference with
prospective
economic
relations
reaches
beyond
protection of an interest in an existing contract and
protects
a
party's
interest
in
prospective
relationships of economic advantage not yet reduced
to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to be) .
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(which

To illustrate the point, Anthony Middletonfs

testimony

the

its

Middletons

establishes causation.

understandably

ignore),

on

Anthony Middleton1s diary

own,

[Plaintiff's

Exhibit 37] demonstrated that when Boyer first told him about the
proposed development, Anthony Middleton understood

Boyer could

develop the Property without subordination and was angry because
"those birds will derive a very handsome income off the development
without actually including the actual owners of the land at all."
Moreover, Anthony Middleton1s diary entry and testimony on these
issues make no reference to Boyer or Medical Leasing requiring
concessions
4376].

from the Middletons.

[Plaintiff's Exhibit

37; R.

The same evidence makes clear that Boyer still believed the

deal was very alive at that time.
Anthony Middleton admitted that he told Boyer that there
would

be

litigation

if

the

Middletons

were

not

compensated,

probably at a meeting he had with Boyer on August 7 or 8, 1989,
but certainly at a meeting held on September 26, 1989 with Boyer,
Dr.

Ring

and

Dr.

Wong.

[R.

4353-4354,

5606-5609].

Anthony

Middleton further admitted that Boyer told himf both at the August
and September meetings, that he was not interested in doing the
development if the Middletons were going to sue.
4358-4361].

[R. 4353-4354,

Tony Middleton's diary entry concerning the September

26, 1989 meeting [Plaintiff's Exhibit 37] states:
At any rate, we got the point made since then that the
only thing we are interested in is increasing the
income realized from the property in return for which
the Middleton family will agree not to challenge the
contract in court.
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[R. 5618-5619].

As in previous meetings, that meeting involved no

reference to concessions or to Boyer or Medical Leasing needing
anything from the Middletons.

In fact, the phrase "challenge the

contract in court" presumes, as Anthony Middleton anticipated, that
a contract would be entered into between The Boyer Company and
Medical Leasing without the requirement of any consent by the
Middletons.

The only way Anthony Middleton could attempt to stop

it was to threaten a groundless suit.
George Middleton admitted that Anthony told him that Boyer
wanted to develop the Property but was afraid of protracted legal
problems and therefore the project was on hold.

[R. 4951-4952].

Drs. Ring and Wong both testified that Anthony Middleton
threatened Boyer with litigation at meetings on September 26,
1989

and

November

11, 1989

(when

Boyer

said

he was

in a

"litigation box") , and that on more than one occasion Boyer said
he was not interested in attempting to develop the Property with
threats of litigation.
4891, 4920, 4926].

[R. 4126-4138, 4144, 4147, 4182, 4890-

Dr. Ring testified that at the September 26,

1989 meeting Boyer told Anthony Middleton that he had reviewed
the Amended Ground Lease as modified by the Zions stipulation
and

told

him

that

the

documents

seemed

clear

that

Middletons1 consent to development was not required.

Anthony

replied, "Well, I don't think that makes any difference.
stake goes in the ground, the Middletons will sue."
reiterated

two

or

three

times

that

the

Middletons

the

If a

Anthony
had

a

philosophical right to more income and that if they didnft get
it, they would sue.

These threats were made even though there
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was

no request

meeting.

for concessions

from

the Middletons

at

the

Dr. Ring testified that after the threats were made at

that meeting that discussions continued

thereafter, but the

parties never went back to discussing the original deal again.
After that, the focus related to the threats of litigation.
412 6-4133].

This testimony was not contradicted

[R.

either by

Anthony Middleton or Boyer.
Further, the Middletons1
concerns

expressed

suggestion that

in Taylor's March

14, 1989

it was the
letter

that

prevented the deal from going forward is contrary to, inter
alia, the specific testimony of Dr. Ring.

Dr. Ring testified

that at the July 25, 1989 meeting, attended both by Boyer and
Taylor, they discussed the concerns of Taylor and Greg Bell
about financing.

The concerns set forth in Taylor's March 14,

1989 letter were being discussed when Boyer said that, "Those
problems can be dealt with, don't pay any attention to his
attorney, it was not a point of issue", "that's not important,
we don't need to deal with that.
Let's get —

We can work around that.

go ahead and make this deal" and "I came here to

make a deal, I didn't come here to break one."

Boyer said his

major concern was he did not want to get in a litigation box the
way Zions had gotten themselves into it.

Boyer said if Zions

could get financing so could The Boyer Company and that he had
read Greg Bell's letter concerning financing, but did not agree
with it.

Boyer said, "The only thing that I can see that's

going to stop this project at this point is this concern of
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—

mv concern of the threat of litigation."
financing.

Boyer never mentioned

[R. 4115-4121 and 4422-4424].

Boyer did not even recall reading Taylor's March 14
letter before it was sent.

Boyer never allowed the deal to

pivot on financing or Taylor's concerns.
perfectly

clear at the July

including

Boyer,

Middletons.

was

to

Dr. Ring made it

25, 1989 meeting

seek

any

that no one,

concessions

from

the

[R. 4120-4122, 4529-4532, 4590, 4596-4598, 4640].

Anthony Middleton himself confirmed that Medical Leasing was not
asking for any concessions.

[R. 5592].

Parsons confirmed in

detail Dr. Ring's testimony about the July 25, 1989 meeting and
specifically concerning Boyer's statements.

[R. 4530-4532].

In fact, Taylor had little to do with the transaction.
He

was

not

involved

in

any

of

the

negotiations

on

the

Development Agreement, did not look at any of the pleadings in
the Zions litigation and drafted his March 14, 1989 letter based
on an outdated version of the Amended Ground Lease.
4508, 5451-5456, 5485-5486].

[R. 4507-

Although the Middletons place

great importance on the so-called "business hurdles" that Taylor
articulated in his March 14, 1989 letter, Taylor himself could
not and did not testify that those concerns ultimately killed
the deal.

Taylor admitted under cross-examination that he did

not know why Boyer decided to pull out of the deal.
5502].

[R. 5491-

Furthermore, Dr. Ring testified that at the end of the

July 25, 1989 meeting Boyer said that The Boyer Company needed
nothing from the Middletons in order to develop the Property and
that at the September 26, 1989 meeting Boyer indicated he was
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not following Taylors advice.
the

loop with

respect

to

Simply put, Taylor was out of

negotiations

Middleton's threats torpedoed the deal.
Perhaps

the

most

telling

long
[R.

before

Anthony

5486-5497].

indication

of

the

insignificance of Taylor's input into the deal was offered by
Greg Gardner when he was being questioned by Mr. Frankenburg
about his review of Plaintiff's Ex. 33, the working draft of the
sublease which he had discussed with Boyer.

After testifying

that he couldn't recall if he recommended that Boyer should sign
the documents he was asked:

"Q.

Would it be fair to say that

you relied upon The Boyer Company's attorney [Taylor] to make
that determination, isn't it? A.
yes.

For the boilerplate language,

For the business points, I would rely on myself and Roger

[Boyer] for that."

[R. 4791-4792].

Henry Schwendiman placed

Taylor's input in the transaction in a similar perspective when
Schwendiman testified

that the documentation was maybe only

l/100th of a part of the issues that lenders look at when
determining to finance a transaction and that a lender looks at
the strength of the borrower and their track record, the other
deals they have developed, the quality of past developments, the
type of tenants they can attract, the location of the proposed
project, the quality of construction, the parking situation and
similar matters.

[R. 5146-5147].

The evidence at trial, including Boyer's own testimony,
demonstrated that throughout 1989 Boyer was proceeding in good
faith towards an agreement for development of the Property.
4871,

4885].

For

example,

in
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a June

27,

1989

[R.

telephone

conversation with John Parsons, long after Taylor's letter, Greg
Gardner affirmed that Boyer most definitely remained interested
in the Property and Boyer still intended to go forward with the
project.

[R. 4528].

Parsons testified in this regard:

Mr. Hunt: And then the next paragraph — I guess
you've asked him:
"Do you want the deal?" and he
says, "Yes, without a doubt?"
A. Well, before that, I told him that my clients
wouldn't pay any money to Middletons and then I asked
him, "Do you want to deal?" and he said, "Yes, without
a doubt, this is the best available corner in town."
[R. 4583].

Parsons also testified that as of that time the deal

was finished and moving forward except for Boyer's meeting with the
Middletons to obtain comfort with respect to possible litigation
from the Middletons.

[R. 4535-4536].

It was not until September 26, 1989 when Anthony Middleton
pressed home his threats of litigation that serious doubts were
cast on the viability on the deal.

Until that time, Medical

Leasing had not reached any impasse with Boyer.

[R. 4300].

The

threats at the September 26th meeting derailed the negotiations.
After that time, the discussions

centered

on the threats and

different proposals to get around the threats.

[R. 4132-4133].

The Middletons argue that the testimony of Parsons and Drs.
Ring and Wong concerning Boyer's statements to them are "rank
hearsay."

This argument misses the point.

To the extent that the

testimony was hearsay, the court correctly found it admissible
under well recognized exceptions, including Utah Rules of Evidence
Rules 803(1)

(present sense impression) and

(3) (state of mind

including, intent, plan and motive), as it was introduced to show
Boyer's state of mind and his intent with respect to going forward
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with the sublease.10 Consequently, Boyer1s statements were perfectly
admissible.
The Middletons argue that at trial Boyer testified he could
not remember one way or the other the threats of litigation so that
must prove the real reason that Boyer did not go forward with
development of the project was the concerns expressed by Taylor in
his March 14, 1989 letter.

Again, the evidence was otherwise.

It is important to recognize at the outset that the jury
was not bound to believe Boyer's testimony that he could not
remember

whether

Anthony

Middleton

had

threatened

litigation.

Boyer admitted that he and Anthony Middleton were long-time friends
who were both involved as leaders of their stake in the L.D.S.
church.
and

Boyer was at best a reluctant witness with a convenient

almost

total

memory

lapse

concerning

the

transactions.

Moreover, it is important that Boyer did not deny that threats of
litigation had been made, but only said he could not remember one
way or another whether there were threats.

And, Boyer admitted

that he may have told Anthony Middleton he was not interested in
developing the Property if litigation would be involved and that
threats of litigation would chill development of the Property.
4863-4864].

[R.

Boyer clearly testified that if litigation had been

Even if the hearsay exception had not been available, the statements were necessary predicates to
explain Anthony Middleton's threats in response to the statements, for which use the statements would not be
offered for the truth of the matters stated and therefore would not be hearsay.
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threatened he would not have been interested in proceeding with
the project.

[R. 4872-4873]."

In addition, Boyer obviously understood at the November
11,

1989 meeting that if the deal went forward there would be

litigation.

[R. 5623-5627; Defendants1 Exhibit 27]. There is no

question but that Boyer knew he had been threatened by Anthony
Middleton

because

his

statements

acknowledging

that

fact

are

reflected in the tape transcript of the November 11, 1989 meeting.
[Defendants1 Exhibit D-27].

In that respect, page 32 of Exhibit

D-27 records the following conversation:
Mr. Boyer: We will litigate. We will be willing
to litigate and prepared to litigate the status quo
if we know we're going to be litigating anyway. We're
now in a litigation box. We go forward we litigate,
we go backward we litigate.
Mr.

Ring:

Is that your impression?

Mr. Boyer: I thought that's what both of you
said.
That's the implication.
He said we would
litigate if they don't participate, and you suggested
that I think we have a binding agreement.
Mr.

Ring:

I think we do.

Mr. Boyer: What my point is, if we don't proceed
I think the implication is we litigate. If we did
proceed, the implication is we litigate.
Further, page 18 of Exhibit D-27 records the following
exchange between Dr. Ring and Anthony Middleton in front of Boyer:
Dr. Ring: As a matter of fact, as you said right
off the bat, you said it then and you said at every
meeting we've had, is that if any development happens
out there, we're going to sue.

In that regard Boyer testified:
"Q. And if going forward with this development meant being involved, at all, in litigation with
the Middletons, would it be your determination not to go forward7
A. That's correct, we would not regardless of our friendship.
Q. In other words, litigation itself would be threatening enough?
A. Yes." [R. 4872].
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Anthony Middleton: No. That's only half of what
I said. There would be — very likely be — a suit
entered if zero participation on the part of the
owners.
A transcript of a February 15, 1990 meeting also plainly
evidences that Boyer was backing away from the sublease because of
Anthony Middleton's threats.

At the February 15, 1990 meeting at

Boyer's office, shortly after Taylor's February 5, 1990 letter
announcing Boyer had no further interest in pursuing the project,
Boyer stated:
Well, we had, you know, Tony, he's called a
couple of times. In fact, he called me I think it was
last week and told me, I guess the essence of his
comment was, I feel more strongly about the strength
of my position, that almost is a direct quote, than
I have ever before, after having gotten into this,
which I honestly don't know how he could arrive at
that conclusion, but that is his conclusion.

We had a discussion with Vic and he has
suggested, and I don't know, it may have even been
sent, but we are sending you a letter saying, look,
this is a draft of it, saying, look, get your act
together, when we can make a deal let's talk about a
deal. In the meantime, we're kind of stepping back.
[Defendants' Exhibit 58 at 4]. 12
Although the Middletons now want to argue about whether
Anthony

Middleton's

threats

caused

Boyer

to

walk

from

the

transaction, the evidence was beyond question that was exactly the

12

The Middletons point to Taylor's letter of February 5, 1990 in which Taylor notified Medical Leasing
that Boyer was no longer interested in pursuing the project as proof that Boyer refused to go forward with the
project because the concessions mentioned in Taylor's previous letter had not been obtained. At best, Taylor's
letter was ambiguous in this regard. Interpreting the letter in the light most favorable to Medical Leasing,
the letter totally supports Medical Leasing's theory that the Middletons' refusal to assure Boyer he would not
be sued was what destroyed the deal. But, even if the letter is construed as meaning what the Middletons say
it does, the jury was not bound to believe that the reasons asserted by Taylor in his letter were the real
reasons for Boyer's decision not to go forward, especially when Taylor testified he didn't know why The Boyer
Company pulled out. Obviously, as of February, 1990, Boyer was attempting to avoid any potential claim by
Medical Leasing. Taylor's letter is also contradicted by the evidence of Boyer's own statement as to why Boyer
did not proceed.
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result

Anthony

Middleton

intended

unless

Medical

surrendered to his demands for more money.

Leasing

He knew from his

earlier experience with the Zions litigation that by threatening
litigation he could forestall development.

[R. 4340-4341].

In

fact, he wrote in his diary of his intention to forestall and, if
necessary,

to

block

development

Exhibit 37; R. 4344-4347].

by

litigation.

[Plaintiff's

Anthony Middleton even reminded Boyer

that timing was critical in financing a commercial development and
that

outside

of

the

appropriate

time window

it would

increasingly difficult for Boyer to get financing.
Both

Medical

Leasing1s

and

the

Middletons'

expert

become

[R. 5628].
testimony

confirmed the disastrous effect that threats of litigation would
have on a proposed transaction.
5326].

[R. 5099-5100, 5118-5119, 5325-

In short, Anthony Middleton's threats had exactly the

intended result.
The jury heard all the evidence and obviously refused to
accept the Middletons' theory that the reason Boyer refused to go
forward

with

the project

related

to

concerns

expressed in Taylor's March 14, 1989 letter.

about

financing

The jury's reaction

was not surprising in view of the overwhelming evidence that the
only reason Boyer walked from the Property was because of Anthony
Middleton's litigation threats.13

The Middletons were asking the

jury to believe that despite the enormous work that Greg Gardner
testified The Boyer Company had done with respect to the project
over a period of over two years, including getting the Property

Of course, Medical Leasing's burden respecting causation was only to show that the threats were one
of the proximate causes for the termination of the transaction.
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rezoned, and despite the fact that discussions continued unabated
for

many

months

after

Taylor's

letter

with

little,

if

any,

discussion concerning financing, and despite the fact that the
discussions only turned

sour after Anthony Middleton made his

threats, that The Boyer Company walked from the sublease because
of a perceived problem with financing without even attempting to
present the project
Middletons1

for financing to one single lender.

arguments

strained

credulity

and

they

can

The
hardly

complain that the jury did not agree.
The Middletons also assert in passing that their experts,
Gary Banks and Gregory Bell, were of the opinion that the proposed
project

could

not

be

financed

by

concessions from the Middletons.

The

Boyer

Company

without

Again, the Middletons fail to

marshal the evidence in this regard.

As is set forth earlier in

this brief (p. 24, fl 28), Medical Leasing's expert testified that
in

his

opinion

the

project

could

be

financed

without

any

concessions. The jury obviously believed Medical Leasing1s expert.
The evidence fully supported, if not compelled, the jury verdict.

E.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED MEDICAL LEASING

ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The Middletons

contend

that the

trial

court

erred

in

awarding attorney's fees to Medical Leasing because the Middletons
were not given a notice of default as supposedly

required by

paragraph 16 of the Amended Ground Lease, that attorney's fees
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allegedly cannot be awarded for breach of the implied covenant of
food faith and fair dealing, and because, so the argument goes,
there was no finding that the Middletons breached the express terms
of the Amended Ground Lease.

These arguments should be rejected.

1. Notice of Default Was Not Required in Order for Medical
Leasing to be Entitled to Attorney's Fees and. In Any Event, Notice
Was Given.

Paragraph 16 of the Amended Ground Lease contained the
following attorney's fees provision:
If Landlord or Tenant default hereunder or file
suit against the other which is any way connected with
this Lease, the defaulting party shall pay to the
prevailing party a reasonable sum for attorney's fees,
which shall be deemed to have accrued on the
commencement of such action and shall be enforceable
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment.
[Emphasis added].
The Middletons' argument that in order to be entitled to
attorney's fees under this provision Medical Leasing was required
to give a written notice of default under paragraph 6 of the
Amended Ground Lease cannot withstand analysis for at least three
reasons.
First, as demonstrated earlier

(pp. 41-43), and as the

trial court ruled, paragraph 6 only required that a notice of
default

be given

before

the non-defaulting

party

could

incur

certain expenses in the performance of the lease or before the
Middletons could terminate the lease.

Paragraph 6 expressly did

not limit any other remedies which the parties had.
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Second, as earlier set forth (p. 44) , notice of default was
in fact given to the Middletons on December 8, 1989 when Medical
Leasing's attorney, Mr. Parsons, sent to Richard P. Middleton on
behalf of all the Middletons a copy of Parsons' previous November
17, 1989 default letter.
Third, Medical Leasing was entitled to recover attorney's
fees

under

paragraph

16

whether

or

not

the

Middletons

were

technically in "default" under paragraph 6 because paragraph 16
allows attorney's
"which

is

any

way

fees to the prevailing party
connected

with

this

Middletons made this very argument below.

Lease."

in any lawsuit
Indeed,

the

They asserted that a

party is entitled to attorney's fees under the Amended Ground Lease
in two situations, that is if (1) the other party defaults; or (2)
if the party prevails in a lawsuit which is in any way connected
with the Lease.

[See Williams

& Hunt's Objection to Medical

Leasing's Application for Attorney's Fees, and Moyle & Draper's
Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Attorney's
Fees, R. 1261-1264, 1268-1269].

The Middletons were correct in

that regard.

2.

The Middletons Did Breach the Express Terms of the

Amended Ground Lease.

The Middletons, in ostrich-like fashion, erroneously argue
that Medical Leasing never identified any breach by the Middletons
of the express terms of the Lease and that, in any event, the jury
never found a breach of the express provisions of the Lease.
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To

the

contrary,

the

Middletons1

wrongful

threats

of

litigation made in order to derail the sublease with The Boyer
Company constituted a breach of the express provisions of paragraph
8 of the Amended Ground Lease under which they agreed that the
Property could be developed by an independent third party without
their consent unless subordination was sought.
The claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing was also grounded upon the provisions of paragraph
8.

The Utah Court of Appeals made it clear in Ted R. Brown &

Associates v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970-71 (Utah App. 1988),
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not something
floating around unconnected to the contract between the parties.
The covenant in fact arises from the contractual obligations the
parties have voluntarily undertaken:
In exercising its rights under this final
modification of the parties1 contract. C a m e ' s implied
duty of good faith did not reguire it to keep
extending the deadline ad infinitum until the Church
contract was awarded. '[W]here the parties have made
an express contract, the court should not find a
different one by implication concerning the same
subject matter if the evidence does not justify [such]
an inference1 . . . In other words, such an inference
or covenant relating to a specific contract right
excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a
different or contradictory nature. . . .
It is fundamental that every contract imposes a
duty on the parties to exercise their contractual
rights and perform their contractual obligations
reasonably and in good faith . . . Nonetheless, a
court may not make a better contract for the parties
than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a
court may not enforce asserted rights not supported
by the contract itself. . . .
[753 P.2d at 970] [Emphasis added].

See also St. Benedict's Dev.

v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
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Thus, the jury's finding of a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case could only
have been premised on a finding that paragraph 8 of the Amended
Ground Lease was expressly breached,

[See Jury Instruction No. 24,

R. 1541-1542]. Accordingly, the fact that special verdict question
number 4 asked the jury whether the Middletons had breached the
express terms of the Amended Ground Lease "and/or" the implied
covenant of good faith is irrelevant.
The Middletons place great emphasis on McKenzie v. KaiserAetna , 127 Cal.Rptr. 275 (Cal. App. 1976).
point.

McKenzie is not on

In McKenzie, the attorney's fees provision in the contract

only allowed attorney's fees "in any action brought to enforce the
performance of this contract, or any of the terms, covenants or
conditions thereof. . . . "

The court thus observed that it was

"necessary to determine whether all those causes of action were
'action[s] on [the] contract.'" The court concluded that an action
for negligent misrepresentation is not an action on contract and
that because the jury could have awarded its verdict on the basis
of the negligent misrepresentation theory, fees could not be
awarded.
In stark contrast, the attorney's fee provision in the
present case allows fees in any suit which is "in any connected
with this Lease." Both Medical Leasing's claims for express breach
of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing were actions on the contract and "connected with" the
Amended Ground Lease.
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3.

Medical Leasing Was Entitled to Attorney's Fees For

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

The Middletons rely on this Court's decision in Cluff v.
Culmer, 556 P. 2d 498 (Utah 1976), in support of their argument that
attorney's fees cannot be awarded for breach of the covenant of
good faith.

The Middletons' reliance is misplaced.

In Cluff, this Court upheld the trial court's refusal to
allow attorney's fees, finding that an implied covenant arising
from the landlord/tenant relationship (not the contract) that the
tenant would not commit waste did not come within the scope of the
attorney's fees provision because an action to recover damages for
waste did not constitute an action to enforce the written contract.
In other words, the implied covenant in Cluff did not arise from
the language of the contract, but was grounded upon the existence
of the landlord/tenant relationship.

The three cases cited by the

Cluff court, Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930), Leone v.
Zuniga, 34 P.2d 699 (Utah 1934), and Jacobsen v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294
(Utah 1954), all involved contracts with a narrow attorney's fee
provision

that

only

allowed

fees

in

suits

to

"enforce"

the

contract.

In each case, the contract had already been forfeited

and the court ruled the suit therefore was not to enforce the
contract.
In the case at bar, the breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by the Middletons was in fact based
upon the language of the paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease
entitling Medical

Leasing to sublease
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for development

without

consent. The breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing

constituted

attorney's

a breach

fee provision

of the

lease.

in the present

Moreover, the

case, which

allows

attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an action in any way
connected with the lease, is much broader than the provision in
Clufff which only allowed fees incurred in the "enforcement of the
contract."

Courts have allowed attorney's fees for breach of

implied contract or warranty in situations far less clearly within
the language of the contract permitting fees.

See, e.g., Cabal v.

Donnelly, 714 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Or. App. 1986); Geraci v. Crown
Chevrolet, Inc.. 444 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (Mass. App. 1983).

4.

The Award of Attorney's Fees Was Not Defective Because

Medical Leasing Did Not Set Out the Time and Fees Expended for
Unsuccessful

Claims and Claims For Which There Would

Be No

Entitlement to Attorney's Fees.

At trial, the parties stipulated to reserve the issue of
attorney's fees until after the jury returned its verdict, at which
time the parties would present their evidence of attorney's fees
by way of affidavit. After the jury returned its verdict, Medical
Leasing filed its affidavits concerning fees setting forth in
substantial detail the services performed and the amount of fees
incurred.

Copies of the billings listing the services performed

by date, the attorney performing the service and the time spent
were attached.

Medical Leasing asked for $319,502.00 attorney's

fees and approximately $55,000.00 in other fees and costs (in
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addition to taxable costs).

The court cut this request by almost

$100,000.00 and awarded $275,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees.
The parties then entered into a stipulation by which the
Middletons agreed to waive any claim or right to contest the
court's determination that $275,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's
fee.

The Middletons, however, reserved their right to claim that

Medical Leasing failed to allocate time and fees expended

for

successful claims for which there allegedly was not an entitlement
to attorney's fees, unsuccessful claims for which there would not
be an entitled to attorney's fees had the claims been successful,
and claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney's fees.
[R. 2950-2952].
The Middletons claim in this regard that Medical Leasing
was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for its claims of
interference with contract, interference with prospective economic
relations or breach of the covenant of good faith and that all time
associated with preparing the original complaint, which was later
amended, and responding to a partially successful motion to dismiss
must be disallowed.
Of

course,

These contentions are without merit.
the

point

of

beginning

for

an

award

of

attorney's fees is the attorney's fee provision contained in the
contract.

As this Court said in Travner v. Cushina, 688 P.2d 856,

858 (Utah 1984) :
[A] party is entitled only to those fees
attributable
to the successful vindication
of
contractual
rights within the terms of their
agreement. [Emphasis added].
The

attorney's

fee provision

previously noted, is extremely broad.
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in the present

case, as

That provision allowed fees

to the prevailing party in any suit having any connection with the
Lease.

All of Medical Leasing's claims, under the alternative

theories, arose out of the same wrongful acts and sought to
vindicate Medical Leasingfs right under the Amended Ground Lease
to sublease the Property for development.
In this regard, the fact that early on in the case Medical
Leasing!s

separate

dismissed

is

claim

irrelevant

for

interference

because

Medical

with

contract was

Leasing

ultimately

prevailed on its claims for breach of contract and interference
with prospective economic relations, each of which theories were
grounded upon the same wrongful conduct of the Middletons.

Under

the Middletons1 argument, if suit were brought for breach of
contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit alleging the failure
of a defendant to pay amounts due under a contract and the
plaintiff only obtained judgment for the full amount due on the
breach of contract theory, the plaintiff would only be entitled to
recover a portion of the fees incurred.
incongruous.

Such a result would be

The important point in this case is that Medical

Leasing recovered 100% of the damages it was seeking in the amount
of $2,582,780.00 plus accrued interest for the wrongful conduct of
the Middletons. Medical Leasing was entitled to recover all of the
attorney's fees incurred in obtaining that judgment.
The Middletons

would

have

this

court

invalidate

the

attorney's fee award on the basis that it must be reduced by the
time associated with responding to a motion to dismiss, as a result
of which Medical Leasingfs claim for an injunction was dismissed.
To the contrary, the claim for an injunction was simply part of the
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claim upon which Medical Leasing ultimately prevailed —

that is

that the Middletons1 wrongful threats of litigation torpedoed the
sublease with The Boyer Company.

In any event, even if it were

appropriate to reduce the fees by those incurred in connection with
the injunction, the information provided to the court below was
more than sufficient for the court to make that deduction.

As

demonstrated below, the amount of attorney's

in

fees incurred

connection with the injunction could not have comprised more than
approximately $2,500.00.

[R. 2696-2698].

Lastly, the Middletons object that Medical Leasing's claims
for fees included $25,000 for the cost of Medical Leasing's damage
expert.

The Middletons provide no support for the argument that

this amount was included by the court in its award.

Moreover, the

Middletons ignore the fact that the court reduced Medical Leasing's
claim for attorney's fees and for the expert fees and other costs
from approximately
approximately

$375,000.00 to

$275,000.00, a reduction of

$100,000.00, which was far more than the amount

claimed for the damage expert. Beyond that, the Middletons did not
reserve the right in the stipulation entered

into between the

parties to claim that the attorney's fee award was improper for
supposedly including this item.

Presumably, the court deducted

this amount in awarding the fees.

In any event, the Middletons

cannot now object to the award on that basis.
In summary, the attorney's fee award by the trial court
was

reasonable, was

fully

supported

applicable law and should be upheld.
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by

the

evidence

and

the

F. THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE MIDDLETONS WERE
JOINTLY LIABLE FOR BREACH OF THE AMENDED GROUND LEASE.

1.

As the Landlord Under the Amended Ground Lease, the

Middletons Were Jointly Liable for Its Breach.

During trial Judge Rigtrup reserved the legal issue of
whether

all

the

Middletons

were

jointly

liable

for

Anthony

Middleton's breach of the Amended Ground Lease because they all
signed the Amended Ground Lease as "Landlord."

After extensive

post-trial briefing and argument, Judge Rigtrup ruled that, in
light of the jury's finding that the Amended Ground Lease was
breached, all the Middletons were jointly liable because they had
all undertaken the obligations as Landlord.
The Middletons attempt to convince this Court that because
as tenants in common they only owned an undivided fractional part
of the Property and because one co-tenant as a general principle
cannot bind another co-tenant's interest in property, that there
is no joint liability in this case for breach of the Amended Ground
Lease.

This argument misses the point.

The trial court did not

hold the Middletons1 jointly liable because they were co-tenants,
but because they had all executed the Amended Ground Lease as
"Landlord" and had thus contractually undertaken joint obligations.
The Middletons also argue that a lease of land by two or
more tenants in common is regarded as several leases by the tenants
of

their

Middletons

undivided
can

find

interest.

The

only

for this proposition
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authority
are

three

which

the

treatises

written

in 1886, 1887 and

1906, respectively, when

Ferguson was still the law of the land.

Plessy v.

Although these cases are

undoubtedly of historical legal interest, they fly in the face of
modern authorities.
Under the modern view, leases are, of course, simply viewed
as contracts that are governed by ordinary principles of contract
law.

See, e.g. , LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 193

(Utah App. 1991); Powell, The Law of Real Property, § 230[2] at
16B-7 (1991) (courts have adopted the view that leases should be
construed like any other contract) . When two or more persons agree
to undertake performance of an obligation pursuant to a contract,
the law presumes that the undertaking of that performance was joint
and holds the parties jointly responsible for the performance of
the undertaking.

Turner v. Gunderson, 807 P. 2d 370, 375 (Wash.

App. 1991); Moore v. Seabaugh, 684 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Mo. App. 1984);
Schneider v. Bvtner. 481 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779

(A.D.3 Dept. 1984);

Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. 1981).

As

is

of

stated

in

Section

289(1)

of

the

Restatement

(Second)

Contracts:
[W]here two or more parties to a contract promise
the same performance to the same promisee, each is
bound to the whole performance thereof, whether his
duty is joint, several, or joint and several.
For any breach of contract, there is only one cause of
action against the joint obligors who are jointly liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiff.

Turner v. Gunderson, 807 P. 2d

at 375 (citing Harrison v. Peuga, 480 P.2d 247 (Wash. App. 1971)).
The presumption of joint liability can only be overcome by
showing from the language in the contract that the parties intended
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their

liability

to

be

several.

Donzella

v.

New

York

State

Throuahwav Authority. 180 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1958);
Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., 518 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Alexander v. Wheeler, 407 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320-21 (A.D. 4 Dept.
1978); Don L. Tullis & Associates, Inc. v. Gover, 577 S.W.2d 891,
900 (Mo. App. 1979); Anderson v. Barnes, 671 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo.
App. 1983).
In the Amended Ground Lease in the present case, each of
the Middletons
agreement

in

signed
the

personally

singular

as

and

were

"Landlord"

denominated
and

there

in the
is

no

differentiation between them with respect to their rights and
obligations.

That designation makes clear that the agreement

contemplated the Middletons would be treated as single obligor and
therefore be jointly liable.

Drawing that same conclusion from

similar language, the court in Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc..
supra, noted:
We have had occasion in the fairly recent past
to point out that 'the general rule is that the
obligation created by the promise of several persons
is joint unless the contrary is made evident.'
[Citations omitted].
The contract before us falls
squarely within the ambit of that principle.
Throughout the contract, Goodman Properties is
referred to by the word "owner."
Similarly, the
Claymans and Hillman are invariably referred to
collectively by the words "respective purchaser" or
"purchaser" always in the singular. Nowhere does the
contract distinguish the three in any way or separate
the rights and obligations among them.
On the
contrary, the contract uniformly treats the three as
a team, without so much as a whisper that thev are to
be differentiated in any ways or for any purpose.
[518 F.2d at 1032] [Emphasis added].
Similarly, in Huggins v. Bacon, 321 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. App.
1984) , the court held that a real estate investor as a joint
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obligor under a contract along with the contractor was liable for
breach of an implied agreement to build a house in a fit and
workmanlike manner.

The court reasoned

that even though the

investor had not worked on the construction of the house, he was
still jointly liable because he had signed the contract.
The Middletons argue that, in fact, the language of the
Amended Ground Lease using the term "Landlord" in the singular
supports the conclusion they their liability is severable, relying
upon F.D.I.C. v. Bismarck Inv. Corp., 547 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976).
The Bismarck court, in clearly

identified dicta, stated that,

"[o]rdinarily, a promise by two or more in the singular number is
prima facie several while a promise in the plural is prima facie
joint."
this

[547 P.2d at 214]. Justice Ellett gave no explanation for

statement.

Although

Justice

Ellettfs

language

is

incomprehensible, the case cited by the court in support of that
statement contains a correct statement of the law and clarifies
what

the

Bismarck

court

meant.

Bismarck

cited

Lovell

v.

Commonwealth Thread Co. , 172 N.E. 76 (1930), which involved two
separate promissors promising clearly different performances.

The

court held each promissor only to their respective promises.

As

to joint obligations generally, however, the Lovell court was in
accord with the cases cited by Medical Leasing on this point:
Where two or more persons covenant with another
by the words "we covenant" the words indicate a joint
covenant, and are to be so considered, unless from the
whole contract it should appear that such was not the
understanding of the parties.
If two covenant
generally for themselves, without any words of
severance, or that they, or any one of them, shall do
such a thing, a joint charge is created.
[172 N.E. at 78] .
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The Middletons assert that the court must look to the
underlying
contract.

circumstances

of the parties

in

interpreting

the

Of course, in interpreting a contract, the court just

looks at the four corners of the contract unless it is ambiguous.
J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988).

The

language of the Amended Ground Lease is not ambiguous in this
regard.

But, even if the court were to look at the circumstances

at the time of execution of the Amended Ground Lease, those
circumstances point to joint liability.

All of the Middletons

owned undivided fractional interests in the Property. None of the
Middletons could separately lease their fractional interest in the
Property.

All of the Middletons had to join together to do so.

Lithia Lumber Co. v. Lamb, 443 P.2d 647 (Or. 1968), cited
by the Middletons, provides no support for their position.

In

Lithia, the court found that different defendants who signed
completely separate contracts which expired at different times and
dealt with separate subjects were not jointly and severally liable.
Although the defendants had all signed a third contract to sell
timber to the plaintiff, because the defendants independently owned
different parcels of timber, the court found their liabilities were
several. In the case at bar, of course, the Middletons did not own
separate

parcels

of

property; they

each

owned

an

undivided

fractional part of the whole parcel and no one Middleton could have
separately leased the Property.
The Middletons next say that the Amended Ground Lease was
ambiguous as to whether the parties intended the Middletons1
promises to be joint or several, necessitating consideration of
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extrinsic evidence.

The Middletons do not even bother to explain

to the court the nature of the ambiguity they contend exists.

The

language of the Amended Ground Lease is, in fact, clear; the legal
result of that language is that the Middletons are jointly liable.
Moreover,

the

only

extrinsic

evidence

to

which

the

Middletons point to support their position is that the Middletons
had separate counsel in the Zions Litigation and that before the
September 26, 1989 meeting Dr. Wong made an effort to inform
Richard G. Middleton of the meeting, to which Mr. Middleton replied
that he knew of the discussions but that Anthony Middleton only
represented one-third of the family.

The fact that the Middletons

had been represented by different counsel in litigation is, of
course, unremarkable and largely irrelevant. Parties jointly bound
on contracts are commonly represented by separate counsel because,
even though they are jointly bound on the contract, the obligors
may have claims for indemnity against each other or have other
conflicting interests.

The fact that Dr. Wong was told on one

occasion respecting a single meeting in 1989 that Anthony Middleton
did not speak for all of the Middletons was relevant to the issue
of agency, but it has nothing to do with the legal obligation of
the Middletons as "Landlord" under the Amended Ground Lease which
they had executed years before, nor to their intent at the time
they signed the lease.
However,

the

extrinsic

evidence,

even

if

considered,

supports joint liability. Anthony Middleton was the only Middleton
who took part in the communications and meetings which are the
subject of this action concerning The Boyer Company sublease.
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Anthony Middleton testified that he kept the family informed of
what he was doing, including specifically informing George and
Richard G. of the position that he was taking that the Middleton
family was entitled to compensation.

At no time did any of the

Middletons disavow Anthony Middletonfs conduct even after December
8, 1989 when Mr. Parsons sent to Richard G. Middleton a copy of the
November 17, 1989 letter demanding that the Middletons withdraw
their threats of litigation.14

Finally, each month a single rent

payment was faithfully made by Medical Leasing and sent to Richard
P. Middleton who distributed the payment among all the Middletons.
There are compelling policy reasons for the universal rule
holding obligors under a contract —
jointly liable.

including this contract

—

A rule which allows one joint obligor to destroy

the obligee's benefits under a contract, but at the same time
requires the obligee's full performance to the other joint obligors
would set commercial transactions, large and small, on their heads.
For example, if the Middletons' position is correct, then one
Middleton could prevent Medical Leasing from using the Property,
but the other Middletons could still demand payment of their share
of the rent.

That is exactly the type of absurd result which the

joint obligor rule avoids. Add to that the Middletons1 notion that
the burden

is on the obligee to discover which

of the

joint

obligors breached and that the obligee's remedy is limited only to
that

person,

and

contract

law

would

be

turned

on

its

head.

The Middletons in fact argue that: "Even Anthony's actions were consistent with the parties'
expectations." [Movie & Draper Brief, p. 25]. The malicious threats were not remotely consistent with Medical
Leasing's expectations, but if they were consistent with the Middletons', the Middletons have little reason to
be upset when the activity they "expected" resulted in their jointly liability.
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Clearly, the rule recognizes that one must choose his other joint
obligors carefully and that if one obligor breaches the contract,
then the other joint obligors, who are in the best position to
prevent or cure the breach, are the ones who bear the risk of the
breach, rather than placing the risk of the breach on the obligee.
The other obligors are therefore given a strong incentive to see
that all of the obligors comply with their obligations and to take
appropriate remedial action if those obligations are not being
honored.

For example, in the present case, this whole litigation

could have been avoided if the other Middletons would simply have
rejected

Anthony

Middleton's

conduct

and

announced

that

the

Middletons would honor their contractual obligations.

2.

Whether Or Not All of the Middletons Would Have Had to

Join in Litigation on the Amended Ground Lease is Irrelevant.

The Middletons attempt to convince the court that they
could

not possibly

be jointly

liable

for Anthony

Middleton's

wrongful threats of litigation because, so the Middletons argue,
all of them would have had to join together in a lawsuit against
Medical Leasing on the lease to make good on the threat.

This

argument is simply wrong.
In the first place, the Middletons miscite R. Powell and
P.

Rohan,

Law

of

Real

Property,

§

606[1]

(1991),

for

the

proposition that any action on the lease would have to be joined
in by all of the Middletons.

Powell only states that in actions

against lessees to recover rent, the joinder of all co-tenants is
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usually

required.

A

lawsuit by Anthony Middleton

to prevent

development of the Property would not have been one to recover
rent.
More importantly, whether or not all of the Middletons
would have had to join in a lawsuit against Medical Leasing with
respect to Medical Leasing's right to sublease the Property to The
Boyer Company for development is beside the point.

The wrong

complained of in this lawsuit was not the filing of groundless
litigation, but the threat to do so.

Those threats were made by

the Landlord under the Amended Ground Lease and the Landlord is
liable for the threats. And, none of the Middletons ever disavowed
the threats.

3.

Medical Leasing Pled Joint Liability.

Finally, the Middletons contend that Judge Rigtrup erred
in finding all of them jointly liable as the Landlord under the
Amended Ground Lease because Medical Leasing supposedly failed to
plead

joint liability

on any theory other than agency.

This

contention was properly rejected by the trial court.
The Amended Complaint unquestionably alleged that all of
the Middletons breached the Amended Ground Lease and were liable
for that breach.

Paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint stated that

the, "action arises out of Defendants1 course of conduct which
constitutes a breach of contract . . ." [R. 319]. In paragraph 4,
Medical

Leasing

'Landlord1

alleged

that,

and Medical Leasing

".

. . the

is the
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Defendants

are the

'Tenant1 under the 1980

Amended Ground Lease."

Paragraph 14 recited that, the "Defendants

are collectively referred to in this Complaint as 'Defendants1, the
'Middletons1
Lease."

or the

'Landlord1

under

the

1980 Amended

Ground

Paragraph 51 of the Amended Complaint alleged that all of

the Middletons breached the Amended Ground Lease by seeking to
preclude Medical Leasing from subleasing by improper threats of
litigation.

Medical Leasing went on to seek recovery of damages

for breach of the Amended Ground Lease from all of the Middletons.
After

thoroughly

reviewing

the

allegations

of

the

Amended

Complaint, Judge Rigtrup concluded that the pleading was, in fact,
sufficient notice of Medical Leasing1s claim that the Middletons
were jointly liable.

[R. 5958-5960].

The Middletons1 position apparently is that Medical Leasing
was obligated to expressly allege in the Amended Complaint the
legal theory that because each of the Middletons executed the
Amended Ground Lease as the "Landlord" that they were jointly
liable.

To the contrary, Medical Leasing was only required under

Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to allege a short and
plain statement of the facts upon which
Medical

Leasing undisputedly

did

so.

its claim was based.

Medical

Leasing had no

obligation to plead the legal conclusion that all of the Middletons
were liable because they signed the Amended Ground Lease.

In fact,

pleading legal conclusions or arguments, although not fatal, is
actually considered a pleading defect. See, e.g., Bond v. Dunmire,
473 N.E.2d 78 (111. App. 1984) (allegations of legal conclusions
constitute merely

formal defects in complaint, not defects of

substance); Aster v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y.
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1961) (legal conclusions are improper in pleading and party should
not be required to answer them); Reinert v. Carver, 41 So.2d 449
(Fla. 1949).
The Middletons miscite New Jersey Office Supply, Inc. v.
Feldman. 1990 LW 74477 (U.S.D.C.N.J. 1990), and Sharkey v. Lathram,
156

N.E.2d

502

(Ohio

1959),

for

the

liability should be separately pleaded.

proposition

that

joint

These cases only stand for

the proposition that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
show joint liability, a standard clearly met by Medical Leasing in
the case at bar.
The Middletons1 claim of surprise strains credulity.

The

essential facts underlying the joint obligation of the Middletons
as Landlord under the Amended Ground Lease were clearly alleged.
The Middletons had sufficient notice to allow them to prepare their
defense.

It was their responsibility to conduct appropriate legal

research and discovery to meet the legal issues raised by the facts
alleged in the pleadings.

The Middletons cannot blame the trial

court or Medical Leasing if they failed to do so.ls

G.

THE JURY'S AWARD OF LOST PROFITS TO BE SUFFERED BY

MEDICAL LEASING DURING THE REMAINING TERM OF THE AMENDED GROUND
LEASE WAS ENTIRELY PROPER.
The jury awarded Medical Leasing compensatory damages in

In this regard, although the Middletons point to jury instruction number 14 concerning the claims of
the parties as supposedly showing that the joint liability issue was never raised and that only agency had been
raised as a ground for joint liability, the instruction shows just the contrary:
"Medical Leasing claims that all actions of Anthony Middleton referred to in the
previous paragraph are attributed to each and every other Defendant by the rules of the
law, including the rules of agency."
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the sum of $2,582,780.00, representing the profits Medical Leasing
lost as a proximate result of the destruction of the proposed
sublease with The Boyer Company. This amount was the present value
of the rent which The Boyer Company would have paid Medical Leasing
under the proposed sublease.
The Middletons now argue that the juryfs award of damages
to Medical Leasing for loss of profits during the remaining term
of the Amended Ground Lease was improper because Medical Leasing
supposedly failed to mitigate its damages, because the case of Reid
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), allegedly
prohibits a jury from awarding future lost profits and because
there was not sufficient evidence of the amount of lost profits.
These arguments are without support in the evidence or under the
applicable law.

1.

The Middletons Failed to Meet Their Burden of Proving

that Medical Leasing Did Not Take Reasonable Action to Mitigate its
Damages.

The Middletons pled mitigation as an affirmative defense
in this action.

The Middletons, of course, had the burden of

proving by competent evidence that Medical Leasing could have
mitigated its damages by reasonable effort and expense.
Board of Education. 564 P.2d

294, 298

Pratt v.

(Utah 1977); John Call

Engineering v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990); A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts. § 1039 (1964).

This burden required

the Middletons to prove what Medical Leasing could have done to
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mitigate its damages and how much of the losses could have been
avoided through such efforts.
The Middletons did not even attempt at trial to meet their
burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

One searches the record

in vain for any mention by the Middletons of the mitigation issue
or any attempt to present evidence thereon.

The Middletons put on

not one word of testimony concerning what Medical Leasing could
have done with the Property or how much loss could have been
avoided.16
Medical

In fact, the Middletons vehemently argued at trial that

Leasing was not damaged

by the threats

of

litigation

because the Property could not be commercially developed without
the Middletons granting concessions they were not obligated to
grant under the Amended Ground Lease.

In other words, Medical

Leasing could not possibly have done anything to mitigate.
Middletons1

belated

cry

of

failure

to mitigate

is

The

inherently

inconsistent with the position they took at trial.
Not only did the Middletons entirely fail to carry their
burden on the mitigation issue, the expert testimony on damages
from both sides demonstrated that Medical Leasing could have
done

nothing

to

mitigate

its

damages.

Medical

Leasing's

financing expert, Henry Schwendiman, testified that because of
the state of the commercial lending industry and the economy

Dr. Ring testified that prior to trial Medical Leasing had not attempted to sublease the property to
anyone else because it could not do so in good faith without disclosing Anthony Middleton's threats of
litigation.
CR. 5046-5047]. Medical Leasing was not required to cave in to Anthony Middleton's coercive
demands and threats of litigation in order to mitigate damages.
Hector. Inc. v. United Savings & Loan
Association, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). Further, the evidence was undisputed that the threats had been issued
by Anthony Middleton, and had never been withdrawn. In fact, Anthony Middleton testified that his position at
trial was the same as when he talked to Boyer, Medical Leasing and his diary in the events leading up to the
suit.

85

relating to commercial office space there was only a remote
chance that a developer could obtain financing for development
within the ten years following trial.
5136-5145].

[R. 5100-5101, 5124-5127,

Mr. Schwendiman testified that at the end of ten

years, even if a developer were then still interested in the
Property, the remaining term of the Amended Ground Lease would
be

of

an

insufficient

length

of

time

to

amortize

that

developer's loan so the developer could realize an adequate
return on his original investment.

Mr. Schwendiman testified

that as the amortization of a loan is shortened, the monthly
payment stays the same, but the loan amount gets smaller.

Thus,

the developer is required to invest more of his own money and
borrow less.

The rents and net income stay the same and the

developer gets a smaller return on his investment.

[R. 512 3-

5145].
Medical

Leasing

presented

alternatives for calculating damages.
R. 5210-5218].
able

to

jury

with

three

[Plaintiff's Exhibit 47;

One alternative assumed Medical Leasing would be

secure

alternative

the

a

assumed

sublease
ten

within

years.

five

However,

years,

a

second

because

the

jury

believed Medical Leasing's evidence that the lack of feasibility
of financing any kind of development after the withdrawal of The
Boyer Company precluded mitigation through a future sublease, it
awarded damages according to the third alternative which was
that Medical Leasing would be unable to sublease the Property
for the remainder of the Amended Ground Lease term.
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Not

only

did

the

Middletons

not

contravene

Mr,

Schwendiman's testimony on this point, but their own experts1
testimony supported that conclusion.

The Middletons1 experts

testified that Plaintiff could not sublease the Property for
development back in 1989-1990, at the time of trial or in the
future.

The jury rejected the conclusion about 1989-1990,

accepting Anthony Middleton's appraisal of Boyer as a worldclass developer and concluding with Boyer that The Boyer Company
could have done the project.

As to "now" or the "future,11 the

experts on both sides all agreed the chances were slim to none.
[R. 5399-5404, 5348-5359].
Company

was

destroyed.

a

one-time

The transaction with The Boyer
opportunity

that

the

Middletons

They must pay for the entire loss caused by their

actions.
The court properly instructed the jury on mitigation
[Jury Instruction No. 30, R. 1548] and, in awarding Medical
Leasing prospective damages, the jury obviously believed Medical
Leasingfs evidence that it could not mitigate
because

the

Middletons1

breach

left Medical

its damages
Leasing

with

undeveloped Property that could not produce rent for Medical
Leasing in the future. The Middletons did nothing to meet even
their burden of production with respect to mitigation.

There

simply is no basis for disturbing they jury's determination.
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2.

The Reid Case is Not Applicable to the Case at Bar.

The Middletons misread and misapply the case of Reid v.
Mutual

of

Omaha

Ins.

Co.,

776

P.2d

896

(Utah

1989),

in

attempting to avoid the jury's award of future lost profits by
arguing that damages could only be awarded through the date of
trial.

The holding in Reid is confined to a narrow factual

circumstance not present in the case at bar.
In Reid, a tenant defaulted
abandoned the premises.

in payment of rent and

The landlord sought to recover rental

due through the entire remaining term of the lease.

Although

this Court recognized that a commercial lease is a contract
governed by principles of contract law and that the "concept of
mitigation of damages is grounded in traditional contract law
principles . . . "

[776 P.2d at 904 n.8], the court carved out

a narrow exception to the general rule on mitigation by imposing
upon a landlord suing a tenant for unpaid rent a continuing duty
to mitigate damages by making reasonable efforts to relet the
premises throughout the remainder of the lease term.

Thus, the

court held that in a suit by a landlord against a tenant for
unpaid rent, the landlord is only entitled to recover rent due
through the date of trial and must thereafter collect future
rent in supplemental proceedings.
Reid did not purport to change the general rule that the
breaching

party

must

plead

and

prove

mitigation

as

an

affirmative defense or that damages for future lost profits can
properly be awarded.

Insofar as Medical Leasing has been able
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to

ascertain,

there

is

not

one

case

in

all

of

American

jurisprudence which has applied the rule of the Reid case to
anything but a suit by a landlord for unpaid rents.
Of course, the case at bar does not involve a claim by
a landlord cigainst a tenant for unpaid rents.

Rather, this is

a suit by the tenant against the landlord for breach of the
express provisions of the lease, the covenant of good faith and
fair

dealing

implied

in

the

lease,

and

for

the

tort

of

intentional interference with prospective economic relations,
causing Medical Leasing a substantial loss of future profits
that could have been realized through a sublease with The Boyer
Company.

The fact that Medical Leasing's lost profits claim is

measured by the rent it would have received

from The Boyer

Company over the remaining term of the lease does not somehow
transform this into a suit by a landlord against a tenant for
unpaid rents.
Utah courts, consistent with the courts throughout the
nation, embrace the principle that leases are contracts which
are governed by ordinary contract principles.

See, e.g., LMV

Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin. 805 P.2d 189, 193 (Utah App. 1991); see
also Powell, Law of Real Property, § 230[2] at 16B-7 (1991).

It

is, of course, a well established principle of contract law that
a

party

is

entitled

to

recover

all

foreseeable

damages

proximately caused by a defendant's breach, including damages
for losses reasonably certain to occur in the future, and is not
limited to damages occurring to the date of trial.
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This Court's decision in Penelko. Inc. v. John Price
Associates, Inc.r
point.

642 P.2d

1229

(Utah 1982), is directly on

In Penelko. the landlord constructed a 3 5-foot driveway

between the tenant's theater and an adjacent restaurant which
had the effect of eliminating approximately fifty parking spaces
which had been available for the tenant's customers. The tenant
sued the landlord for breach of the lease and for tortious
interference with the tenant's business.

The jury entered a

verdict in favor of the tenant and against the landlord in the
amount of $65,000.00, representing the amount of future lost
profits resulting from the landlord's wrongful conduct.
The landlord contended that it was improper for the
trial court to have allowed the jury to speculate as to future
lost profit.

The Penelko court rejected this argument and held

that the lost profits had been properly awarded, observing:
The crucial question in awarding future damages
involving a breach of the lease which affects the
long-term value of the lease or the lessee's profit
making potential is whether such damages can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty.
[Citations
omitted]
The record shows that plaintiff's expert
accountant prepared exhibits and testified as to the
profits which could have reasonably been anticipated
for future operations based on the plaintiff's past
operations. . . . The jury found on the basis of
evidence presented at trial that Price was guilty of
certain continuing lease violations.
This fact
distinguishes this case from Guntert v. City of
Stockton . . . cited by Price, wherein it was held
that where there is only a partial breach of contract
the injured party may recover damages only to the time
of trial and may not recover future damages.
[642 P.2d at 1235].
As recognized in Penelko, any notion of an ongoing duty to
mitigate contract damages after trial is entirely at odds with the
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well-settled principle that a total breach of a contract gives rise
to one action that must resolve all of the plaintifffs claims for
present

and

prospective

mitigation defense.

damages

and

all

of

the

defendant's

Thus, in Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of

America, 442 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1968), the court stated:
[A]n entire claim arising either upon a contract
or from a wrong cannot be divided and made the subject
of several suits. In such a case it is no warrant for
a second action that the party may not be able to
actually prove in the first action all the items of
the demand, or that all damages may not then have been
actually suffered. He is bound to prove in the first
action, not only such damage as has been actually
suffered, but also such prospective damage by reason
of the breach as he may be legally entitled to, for
the judgment he recovers in such action will be a
conclusive adjudication as to the total damage on
account of the breach.
[Id. at 382].
The obligation of a tenant to mitigate prospective economic
loss in the face of interference by the landlord with the business
contemplated by the tenant's lease is entirely inconsistent with
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co.
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

In Leigh Furniture, the Supreme

Court specifically held that the jury could determine the tenant's
prospective loss of business based on evidence at the time of trial
of the landlord's interference with the tenant's business.

In that

case, the Supreme Court permitted the jury to assess prospective
economic loss with respect to unidentified customers on the basis
of projections concerning the effect of the landlord's interference
on such unidentified persons.
In this case, the customer and the business prospects were
concrete and specific and the effect on the subject transaction,
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as demonstrated to the jury, and the amount of damages accruing
from the interference could be specifically and mathematically
calculated. That specific mathematical calculation made by Medical
Leasing1s accounting expert, Merrill Norman, was embraced by the
jury on the grounds that the lease opportunity had been destroyed
and would not in all probability reappear during a period of time
that the lease term would sustain a viable business enterprise.
The Middletons elected not to counter that evidence, but to rely
solely upon their strategic decision to resist liability and avoid
the issue of prospective damage.
Numerous other authorities recognize the right of a tenant
to recover future damages from a breaching landlord.
Noble

v.

Tweedy,

203

P.2d

778

(Cal.

Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 604 P.2d

App.

See, e.g. ,

1949);

198, 204

Sagebrush

(Wyo.

1979);

Restatement (Second) of Property, §§ 7.1 and 10.2 (1977).
Even if, contrary to what is argued above, Reid could be
applied to something other than an action by a landlord for rent,
it would be inapplicable to the present case.
First, Reid and the cases it followed, respecting the same
narrow

context, all

involved

abandoned the property.

situations

where

the

tenant had

The landlord was then left with the

property and no hindrance to reletting it immediately.
case, of course, Anthony Middleton actively

In this

sought to prevent

Medical Leasing from developing the Property and was successful in
doing so. In point of fact, Tony Middleton repeated and reasserted
this "philosophical position" that his family had the right to
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interfere and his prediction they would do so.
never been withdrawn.

Those threats have

The Property could not be relet.

It is a well-settled principle of law that "losses are not
regarded

as

avoidable

if

the

defendant

himself

prevents

the

plaintiff from taking the steps necessary to avoid them," and the
interfering party is precluded from asserting mitigation as an
affirmative defense. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 773 P. 2d 666, 674
(Kan. App. 1989) ; A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 1039 at 250-51
(1964).

Similarly, when both parties to a contract are in equal

positions to mitigate damages caused by one party's breach, the
breaching

party

may

not

assert

mitigation

defense.

Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d

as

an

692, 695

affirmative
(Utah

1982);

Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777-78
(Utah 1983).
Second, and even more importantly, Reid is not applicable
because,

as previously

demonstrated,

the

undisputed

evidence,

including the evidence put forth by the Middletons, proved that
Medical Leasing could not sublease the Property for development in
the future.

3.

The Jury Verdict Does Not Allow Medical Leasing a

Double Recovery.

The Middletons repeat their argument in the court below
that allowing Medical Leasing to recover damages for the remaining
term of the Amended Ground Lease may result in a double recovery
because Medical Leasing has the potential opportunity to sublease
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the Property in the future.

This argument ignores the evidence at

trial and the jury's determination.
The undisputed evidence at the trial was that 1989 was
right at the peak of a boom period for commercial real estate when
financing was relatively easy to obtain

[R. 5119-5122].

Mr.

Schwendiman testified that the financing market started tightening
by the spring if 1990 and became enormously restrictive by the
winter of 1991 because of the savings and loan crisis and pressure
from rating agencies and regulators on insurance companies to
reduce the amount of their portfolios invested in mortgages.

[Id. ]

Mr. Schwendiman testified that although financing developments on
unsubordinated ground leases was very feasible during the time The
Boyer Company was intending to develop the Property, thereafter
such

financing

would

be

rejected

for

more

conventional

arrangements, especially in light of the substantially shrinking
field

of lenders.

[R. 5100-5101, 5119-5122].

As previously

stated, Mr. Schwendiman further opined that it would be five to
seven years before financing was even remotely feasible and ten
years before it would be likely that financing could be obtained
for the development proposed by Boyer, at which time the project
would no longer be feasible.

Such a diminution of the remaining

term of the Amended Ground Lease, even if a developer were still
interested

in

the

Property

at

that

time,

would

leave

an

insufficient length of time to amortize that developer's loan so
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the developer could realize an adequate return on his original
investment.17

[ R. 5145].

Although the Middletons now scream "double recovery," the
Middletons presented not one word of testimony, in any way, to
contradict that of Mr. Schwendiman concerning future development
of the Property and there is no evidence in the record that the
Property can be developed on a sublease during the remaining term
of the Amended Ground Lease.
In fact, as already demonstrated, the Middletons, in an
unsuccessful effort to try to prove that The Boyer Company would
not have b€>en able to finance the proposed development, called
experts to testify that in view of the provisions of the Amended
Ground Lease between Medical Leasing and the Middletons, Medical
Leasing would never be able to sublease the Property because any
prospective

sublessee

would

not be

able

to

obtain

financing.

Accordingly, although the jury rejected the argument that The Boyer
Company could not finance the project at the time the threats were
made, the evidence offered by the Middletons corroborated Medical
Leasing's damage evidence as it applied to future periods.

The

Middletons1 new unsupported contention that Medical Leasing may be
able to make

some productive

use

of the

Property

during

the

remaining term of the lease is pure speculation, is outside the
record of this case and contrary to their own evidence.18

Consistent with the testimony of all experts at trial, no development would occur without complete and
permanent withdrawal of any threats by the Landlord of the groundless litigation, something that was never
accomplished, even at trial.
18

The closest the Middletons can come in their briefs to showing the Property can be developed is to throw
out the obviously improper observation, de hors the record, that one of their attorneys supposedly saw a
Christmas tree lot operating on the Property in December, 1992, after this appeal was filed.
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Whether the Property can be developed during the remaining
term of the ground lease was a determination the jury was required
to make based upon the evidence.

The issue is no different in

principle from any other suit for future lost profits.
case,

a

jury

necessarily

is

required

uncertain

area

opinions and projections.

to make

a

reasoned

based

upon

In any such

judgment

reasonable

in a

estimates,

Medical Leasing presented the jury with

three possible alternatives with respect to future development of
the Property.

The jury obviously believed the competent evidence

that Medical Leasing would be unable to develop the Property under
the sublease for the remainder of the lease term.

There simply is

no basis for overturning that decision.
The Middletons either had no rebuttal evidence on future
development or made a calculated decision at trial not to attempt
to challenge Medical Leasing1s evidence that future development of
the

Property

Middletons

was

are

not

simply

feasible.19
scrambling

Having
to

lost

attempt

the

case, the

to

avoid

the

consequences of their decision or inability to put on any evidence
on this issue. There is no evidence to support the Middletons1 new
position and it should be rejected.
In this regard, to eliminate any possibility of double
recovery, Judge Rigtrup included in the judgment a provision which
allows the Middletons to seek out

future development

for the

Property and to ask the court for credit against the judgment for
a share of profits, if any are even realized,

from any

such

If the Middletons had introduced evidence that Medical Leasing could sublease the Property for
development in the future, it would have run counter to their evidence that no one, not even The Boyer Company,
could have financed the proposed project, at a time when financing was relatively easy.
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development.

Although Medical Leasing does not believe that Judge

Rigtrup technically had the authority to include this provision in
the judgment, Medical Leasing did not resist it nor has Medical
Leasing appealed with respect thereto.

4.

Medical Leasingfs Damage Theory Was Fully Supported

By the Evidence.

Finally, the Middletons contend that Medical Leasing*s
damage theory is fatally flawed because it was based upon the
assumption that Medical Leasing would have received from Boyer
the monthly rents provided in the first draft of the sublease
Medical Leasing prepared and delivered to Boyer on February 3,
1989.

The argument is that there was no basis for such an

assumption because Boyer supposedly testified that after the
Development Agreement expired on January 31, 1989 the parties
talked about different terms for the agreement.

Once again,

this argument is not faithful to the record.
The Development Agreement, executed by The Boyer Company
and Medical Leasing on June 14, 1988, expressly set forth the
rental which Boyer would pay for the Property.

There was no

evidence below that after the Development Agreement expired and
the parties continued their discussions towards execution of a
sublease that the parties ever discussed lowering that rent or
that Boyer ever objected to the amount of rent set forth in the
draft of the sublease.

The drafts of the sublease carried the

same rental rate and that aspect was never a topic of discussion
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or

controversy.

Although

Boyer

testified

that

at

some

unspecified time after February, 1989 the parties talked about
"some scenarios that would have allowed the rent to change," [R.
4852] Boyer did not come close to testifying that there was any
discussion prior to the litigation threats concerning changing
the amount of rent.20

Dr. Wong testified no one ever suggested

to Medical Leasing the business terms of the transaction had to
change.

[R. 4885-4886].

In fact, Greg Gardner, the project

manager for The Boyer Company, testified there was no discussion
concerning changing the rent:
Q.
Isn't it a fact that the only change that was
talked about with respect to the rental provisions
during the year, 1989, was the possible six-months1
slippage in the lease dates? In other words, a sixmonth slippage from when The Boyer Company would have
to start paying rent to Medical Leasing?
Mr.

Frankenburg:

The Court:

Objection, he's leading.

Sustained.

Mr. Gurmankin: Let me ask it this way: Do you recall
any demands proposed by The Boyer Company with respect
to the rent other than some talk of slipping the lease
dates back six months?
A.

No.

[R. 4829].
In Penelko. Inc. v. John Price Associates, Inc., supra, the
Utah Supreme Court recognized that a party is entitled to recover
damages for lost profits if the jury is provided with a sufficient
basis for estimating damages with reasonable certainty.

In this

20

It is interesting to note in this regard that not even Taylor expressed any concerns about the amount
of rent in his March 14, 1989 letter.
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regard, the court noted that although a jury is not allowed to
speculate freely as to the amount of damages or lost profits:
The evidence, however, will be deemed sufficient
to establish a basis for an award of damages for lost
profits where the plaintiff has provided the best
evidence available to him under the circumstances.
[642 P.2d at 1233].

See also Gould v. Mountain States Telephone

& Telegraph Co.. 309 P.2d 802, 805-06 (Utah 1957); GHK Associates
v. Mayer Group, Inc., 274 Cal.Rptr. 168, 179

(Cal. App. 1990);

Flagg v. Andrew Williams Stores, 273 P.2d 294 (Cal. App. 1954).
Medical

Leasing

provided

the

best

evidence

available

concerning the amount of damages it suffered; that evidence was
fully sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

H.

THE JURY VERDICT THAT ANTHONY MIDDLETON TQRTIOUSLY

INTERFERED WITH MEDICAL LEASINGfS

PROSPECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WAS

SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

The jury determined that Anthony Middleton willfully and
maliciously interfered with Medical Leasing1s prospective business
relationship with The Boyer Company, with the dominant purpose to
harm and/or immediately injure Medical Leasing, and awarded Medical
Leasing compensatory and punitive damages.
claims that there

is not sufficient

finding

he

and

relationship.

that

was

privileged

Anthony Middleton now

evidence to support
to

interfere

with

that
the

One more time, the Middletons fail to marshal the

evidence supporting the juryfs verdict.
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1-

Improper Purpose and Improper Means.

In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304
(Utah 1982), this court set forth the elements which a plaintiff
must prove in order to recover for intentional interference with
prospective

economic

relations,

that

is

that

the

defendant

intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or potential
economic relations for an improper purpose or by improper means
causing injury to the plaintiff.

See also St. Benedict's Dev. v.

St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 197 (Utah 1991).
respectfully

submitted

that

in the present

It is

case, both of the

alternative improper purpose or improper means requirements were
met.
First,
improper

the

purpose

requirement

is

satisfied

that
by

a

defendant

showing

that

predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.

act
a

with

an

defendant's

Leigh Furniture,

657 P. 2d at 307. Although it is true, as Anthony Middleton argues,
that there is evidence that one of his purposes was to obtain
economic gain, that is not sufficient to constitute a defense to
a claim of improper purpose under Leigh Furniture.

In the first

place, there is substantial evidence that while Anthony Middleton's
interest was to obtain additional consideration, whether or not he
got it, his first and primary goal was to make sure "those birds",
as he referred to Medical Leasing in his diary, did not obtain a
"handsome income" from the Property.

In that regard, he issued the

threats of litigation knowing (as Boyer had told him) that such
threats would drive The Boyer Company off the project.
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Clearly,

he

understood

his

actions

had

the

substantial

prospect

destroying The Boyer Company deal for all parties.

of

It is also

important to note that he acknowledged to Boyer the narrow window
of opportunity for the development, which was closing, and that
litigation

would

cause

it to be

lost.

[R.

5628].

Anthony

Middleton attentively monitored the death of Medical

Leasingfs

transaction with The Boyer Company and, nevertheless persisted in
his groundless threats.

Even after he knew the Medical Leasing

deal was destroyed, Anthony
withdraw those threats.

Middleton

nevertheless

refused

to

Thus, even though he knew he wasn't going

to obtain any benefit, he acted to insure that Medical Leasing
would not either.

That evidence was consistent with the jury's

finding that his dominant purpose was to injure Medical Leasing in
accordance with the instruction regarding "improper purpose" [Jury
Instruction No. 18, R. 1535] given by the court.
Furthermore, the clear evidence was that Anthony Middleton
acted intentionally to interfere with Medical Leasingfs contract
in order to obtain an economic advantage to which he knew he was
not entitled.

In his diary

note of August

6,

1989, Anthony

Middleton recognized that the Middletons were not entitled to any
compensation

and

that

their

subordination was sought.

consent

was

not

necessary

unless

When Anthony Middleton later made his

litigation threats, he didn f t even attempt to rely on any provision
of the contract; he simply stated it was his "philosophical" belief
that the Middletons were entitled to more money
enough.

and that was

Anthony Middletonfs threats which were intended to block

development of the Property unless his demands were met constituted
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nothing less than extortion.

Whether or not an extortionist has

monetary gain as a predominant goal, that certainly cannot be said
to be a "proper purpose."
But whether or not the improper purpose prong of the Leigh
Furniture test was met, the alternative improper means requirement
was clearly satisfied.
a

showing

The improper means requirement is met by

of such things as threats, intimidation, deceit or

misrepresentation,

unfounded

litigation,

or violations

established standard of a trade or profession."
657 P.2d

of

"an

Leigh Furniture,

at 308; St. Benedictf s Dev. , 811 P.2d

at 198.

For

example, in Leigh Furniture, this court found that the defendant's
actions in forcing defendant to defend two groundless lawsuits
constituted improper means.

The court also opined that although

a deliberate breach of contract is not by itself an "improper
means" that where a deliberate breach of contract is coupled with
an immediate purpose to inflict injury, even though that purpose
does

not

predominate

over

a

legitimate

economic

end,

the

combination is sufficient to constitute an improper means.

As

demonstrated above, in the case at bar, the evidence persuasively
demonstrated

that

the

threats

of

groundless

litigation

were

intended to and did destroy the proposed sublease with The Boyer
Company.
Anthony Middleton does not seriously argue that the threats
were not made, but instead urges this court to adopt a rule that
threats of litigation, regardless of how groundless and malicious,
and despite the fact that they are issued with predominant purpose
to injure and/or cause immediate harm, can never be sufficient for
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an interference with prospective business relationship claim.

The

Middletons contend that only actual litigation which is terminated
favorably and is determined to have been malicious should be a
sufficient

basis

for such

a claim.

In this

regard,

Anthony

Middleton urges the Court that it would be "repugnant to public
policy

to

discourage

positions and alleged

potential

litigants

from

stating

their

rights before resorting to the courts."

[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 46].
The argument that no limitation should be placed

upon

malicious threats of groundless litigation that can be thrown
around

in order to gain advantage in negotiations

is fatuous.

There is just no reasoned basis for arguing that it is against
public policy to discourage people from destroying the business
expectancies of others in order to obtain personal advantage by
making

malicious

groundless,

but

threats
known

of

litigation

to be

groundless.

which

are

As was

not

only

graphically

demonstrated at trial, the issuance of a threat of litigation by
a Landlord in the context of development and financing is an act
that

can

itself

destroy

a

business

transaction.

As

Henry

Schwendiman testified in the present case, the threat of litigation
has an extremely chilling effect on real estate development and is
one of the worst things with which a developer can be confronted.
To allow individuals to maliciously threaten groundless litigation
with impunity invites and encourages exactly the type of malicious
"I have nothing to lose" attitude exhibited by Anthony Middleton
in this case.
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The damage inflicted by Anthony Middleton was complete when
he made his threats.

He did not have to follow through on those

threats by actually filing suit.

Thus, Medical Leasing had no

opportunity to obtain a favorable ruling terminating the threatened
litigation.

That does not mean that Anthony Middleton1s right to

resort to the courts was unprotected.

The protection, of course,

which Anthony Middleton was given in this case is that he was only
held liable for intentional interference with prospective business
relationships after it was first determined that he intentionally
and maliciously made threats of groundless litigation which he knew
were groundless

for the purpose of sabotaging the transaction

unless his demands were met.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d
587

(Cal. 1990), relied upon so heavily by the Middletons, is

clearly distinguishable from the case at bar because in Pacific Gas
the issue before the court was whether liability could be imposed
for inducing "a potentially meritorious lawsuit."
case,

the

litigation

threatened

by Anthony

In the present

Middleton was not

"potentially meritorious"; it was known by him to be groundless.
In addition, in Pacific Gas, the lawsuit which was induced by the
defendant had actually been filed and was still pending.
The other case cited by the Middletons, Blake v. Levy, 464
A.2d 52 (Conn. 1983), is likewise distinguishable.

In Blake, the

prior litigation had been terminated in a good faith negotiated
settlement.

The court held that because it is the policy of the

law to favor settlements, a party to a settlement ought not to be
able to turn around and sue the other party either for malicious
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prosecution or interference with prospective business relationships
for bringing the lawsuit that was settled.
Other courts have held that a party seeking recovery from
interference with prospective business relationships on the basis
of prior unfounded litigation is not required to allege favorable
termination of that litigation.

See, e.g., Erlandson v. Pullen,

608 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Or. App. 1980); Herbert Products, Inc. v. OxyDry Sprayer Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. 1955).

The view adopted

by these cases is even more compelling when it is the wrongful
threat of litigation which inflicted the damage and constitutes the
gravaman of the claim.

2•

Privilege.

Finally, Anthony Middleton insists that he was privileged
to interfere with Medical Leasing's business relationship, relying
upon Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962).

This contention

is frivolous. This court in Bunnell recognized that where a person
has a legal right to perform an act he is not liable because that
act

induces

a breach

of

contract

and

cited

Prosser

for

the

proposition that if a defendant has a present economic interest to
protect, he is privileged to prevent performance which threatens
that interest.

It is pure fantasy to argue that Anthony Middleton

had a legitimate economic interest to protect in the case at bar.
If anything was made clear to the jury by the evidence, including
Anthony Middleton's own testimony, it was that Medical Leasing had
every right to do what it was doing and that the Middletons had no
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right to interfere.

In fact, Anthony Middleton had no economic

interest in the development of the Property by The Boyer Company
and the development of the Property by The Boyer Company did not
threaten, in any respect, the only economic interest which he had - the right to be paid the rent specified in the Amended Ground
Lease with Medical

Leasing.

See Bank of Utah v.

Commercial

Security Bank, 369 F.2d 19, 28-29 (10th Cir. 1966).
Berqfeld v. Stork, 288 N.E.2d 15 (111. App. 1972), relied
upon by the Middletons, is also not close to the point.

In that

case, the plaintiffs leased certain premises from the defendant
upon which they operated a business.

They agreed to sell that

business to a Mr. Steik. At a time shortly before their lease term
was expiring, Steik, seeking suitable quarters for the business,
then entered into a new agreement to lease the premises from the
defendant, but the defendant attempted to renege on the new lease
agreement which was independent of plaintiff's and agreed to lease
the same property to another company.
revocation

by

defendant,

Steik

cancelled

plaintiffs and refused to complete it.
allegations

that

defendant

Because of the attempted
his

contract

with

The court simply found no

intentionally

interfered

with

the

contract between plaintiffs and Steik or that defendant acted
maliciously

against

plaintiffs.

The

court

noted

that

the

defendant's interest in the new lease agreement with Steik was for
his own benefit and his attempt to revoke it to enter into a more
profitable lease at a higher rent was not inconsistent with a good
faith purpose and that the attempted revocation did not cancel the
lease between defendant and Steik nor did it cancel«the contract
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between plaintiffs and Steik.

The two elements found absent in

Bergfeld,

interference

viz,

intentional

and

malice,

were

specifically found present by the jury in this case.
Finally, Anthony Middleton1s conduct could not have been
privileged in any case because, as the jury found, that conduct the
was willful and malicious.
For all of the reasons stated above, there is no basis for
overturning the jury's decision that Anthony Middleton interfered
with Medical Leasing's prospective business relationship.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully
submitted that the Judgment should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this Q

day of March, 1993.
BURBIDGE &^MITCHELL

D^-.l-

Jafy D. Gurmankin
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